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SETTLING THE SCORE WITH SADDAM:
RESOLUTION 1441 AND PARALLEL
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE
OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ*
I.  INTRODUCTION: HOW DO U.S. JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RELATE
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW?
We have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends
the Cold War.  A partnership based on consultation, cooperation,
and collective action, especially through international and regional
organizations.  A partnership united by principle and the rule of
law. . . . A partnership whose goals are to increase democracy, in-
crease prosperity, increase the peace, and reduce arms.1
Former President George H.W. Bush made this statement to the
United Nations General Assembly as United States and coalition
forces were gathering to push Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army out of
Kuwait.  Bush criticized Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as a clear violation
of international law that required a response from the international
community.2  Over a decade after Desert Storm and in the aftermath
of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a newly assertive
United States has placed considerable strain on the existing interna-
tional legal rules governing the use of force by resolving publicly to
end the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime and to do so
unilaterally if necessary.3  The United States has advanced a range of
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1. President George H.W. Bush, The U.N.: World Parliament of Peace, Address to the
United Nations General Assembly (Oct. 1, 1990), in 1 U.S. DEP’T. ST. DISPATCH 151, 152
(1990) (emphasis added).
2. See id. at 151–52.
3. See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on the United Nations Secu-
rity Council Resolution (Nov. 8, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/11/20021108-1.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2002) (“The United States has agreed to discuss
any material breach with the Security Council, but without jeopardizing our freedom of action
to defend our country.  If Iraq fails to fully comply, the United States and other nations will dis-
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debatable legal justifications for military action against Iraq while, af-
ter much internal debate, it simultaneously engaged the United Na-
tions Security Council.4  The resulting Security Council measure,
Resolution 1441, stops short of explicitly authorizing force, yet the
United States maintained that such explicit authorization was unnec-
essary.5  This latest confrontation between the United States and Iraq
illustrates the great challenge faced by the international legal regime
for the use of force.  This regime faces the daunting task of providing
effective restraints on the use of force for an international security
environment in which a lone superpower perceives serious, undeter-
rable threats from terrorists and aggressive states wielding weapons
of mass destruction (WMD).  Despite this challenge, the continued
relevance of international institutions and legal norms is illustrated by
the U.S. decision to modify its approach to Iraq and work in conjunc-
tion with the Security Council despite the opposition of powerful fig-
ures in the Bush administration.6
This paper examines the validity of U.S. justifications for a large-
scale use of force against Iraq in light of relevant international law.
The United States is a founding member of the United Nations Char-
ter.7  The UN Charter proscribes the use of force except in cases of
Security Council authorization or self-defense.8  Both exceptions will
be discussed along with other, less traditional theories as possible jus-
tifications for U.S. military action.
This paper concludes that the justifications for unilateral U.S. ac-
tion are inconsistent with existing international law.  That inconsis-
tency is significant for two reasons.  First, it means that largely base-
less theories for unilateral force helped to influence the behavior of
arm Saddam Hussein.”); Statement by U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte, U.N. Press Release
SC/7564 (Nov. 8, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/archives.htm (last visited
Dec. 1, 2002) (“The resolution contained, he said, no ‘hidden triggers’ and no ‘automaticity’
with the use of force.  The procedure to be followed was laid out in the resolution.  And one
way or another, Iraq would be disarmed.  If the Security Council failed to act decisively in the
event of further Iraqi violation, the resolution did not constrain any Member State from acting
to defend itself against the threat posed by that country, or to enforce relevant United Nations
resolutions and protect world peace and security.”).
4. See Steven R. Weisman, How Powell Lined Up Votes, Starting With His President’s,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at A1.
5. See Statements by President George W. Bush and U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte,
supra note 3.
6. See Weisman, supra note 4.
7. See The United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 287–87e (1994).
8. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2, para. 4, 42, 51.
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the Security Council.  Second, the United States has maintained these
theories even after the passage of Resolution 1441, sustaining their
potential to change the laws governing the use of force.  U.S. attempts
to fashion new rules in response to a changing international security
environment, while understandable, have not yielded a preferable al-
ternative to the current legal regime governing the use of force.  The
U.S. arguments are unattractive because they are not characterized by
any coherent limiting principle to protect the general prohibition on
the use of force.  There is, however, the possibility that no better al-
ternative approach exists to alleviate the strain between international
law and the altered imperatives of self-preservation.
Despite its recourse to the Security Council, the United States
still claims it already has enough authority to unilaterally enforce ex-
isting Council resolutions and also a parallel right to act preemptively
in self-defense.9  Even if the United States obtains explicit Security
Council authorization to use force under Chapter VII of the Charter,
these purported rights may have assumed at least an informal role in
international law.  This is because, in threatening to make the Secu-
rity Council irrelevant, these unilateral justifications likely helped to
compel the Council to initiate decisive measures toward Iraq.  It is
thus vitally important to examine the international legal bases for the
U.S.’ proposed military action to determine whether its claims are
valid under the circumstances or whether, despite their effectiveness
in moving the Security Council, they threaten to obliterate the exist-
ing international legal restrictions on the use of force.
A. Background: The United States and Iraq after September 11th
Shortly following the September 11th attacks, Iraq was identified
as another prime target for an armed attack by the United States.10
Despite reports that one of the alleged hijackers met with Iraqi intel-
ligence agents in Prague in early 2001,11 to date, the Bush Administra-
tion has not made any statement that it has credible evidence indi-
9. See President Bush, Remarks on the United Nations Security Council Resolution, su-
pra note 3.
10. See William M. Arkin, Should Iraq be Next?, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2001), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/nation/columns/dotmil (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
11. John Hendren, U.S. Expands Aggressive Defense in Iraq; Military: Punishing Airstrikes
First Stage of War, Analysts Say.  Meanwhile White House Continues Effort to Link Baghdad, Al
Qaeda, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2002, at A17.
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cating any Iraqi responsibility for the September 11th attacks.12  Sec-
retary of State Colin Powell has gone so far as to admit that he is un-
aware of any “smoking gun” linking Iraq to September 11th.13  Simi-
larly, no reports have emerged to connect Iraq with the anthrax mail
attacks which terrorized the United States in the fall and winter of
2001.14
Despite the lack of connection between these attacks and Iraq,
the tragic events of September 11th have altered the context of the
United States–Iraq confrontation.15  The resulting U.S. shift to an ag-
gressive Iraq policy has forced it to advance legal justifications for a
full-scale invasion of Iraq; justifications that place great strain on the
coherence of the general prohibition on the use of force.  To justify its
policy toward Iraq and other hostile states, the Bush Administration
has developed a new, multifaceted strategic doctrine, known as the
“Bush Doctrine,” that advocates preemptive or preventive strikes
against terrorists, states that support terrorists, and hostile states pos-
sessing WMD.16  The United States has maintained provocative theo-
12. Dana Priest, U.S. Not Claiming Iraqi Link to Terror, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2002, at A1
(reporting that CIA analysts are unable to validate reports that the Iraqi government has ties to
al Qaeda); Walter Pincus, No Link Between Hijacker, Iraq Found, U.S. Says, WASH. POST, May
1, 2002, at A9; KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE THREATENING STORM: THE CASE FOR INVADING
IRAQ xxi–xxii (2002).
13. Bill Keller, The World According to Colin Powell, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 24,
2001, at 63.
14. See POLLACK, supra note 12, at 364.
15. POLLACK, supra note 12.
16. President George W. Bush, Graduation address at the U.S. Military Academy (June 1,
2002), available at htttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html (last
visited Aug. 31, 2002) (“Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means
nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizen to defend. . . . Containment
is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those
weapons or missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. . . . If we wait for threats to fully
materialize, we will have waited for too long. . . . In the world we have entered, the only path to
safety is the path of action.  And this nation will act.”); G. John Ikenberry, America’s Imperial
Ambition, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2002, at 51–52 (“Even without a clear threat, the
United States now claims a right to use preemptive or preventive military force . . . The [Bush
administration’s] worry is that a few despotic states—Iraq in particular, but also Iran and North
Korea—will develop capabilities to produce weapons of mass destruction and put these weap-
ons in the hands of terrorists. . . . [These regimes] might pass along these weapons to terrorist
networks that are not deterred.  Thus another emerging principle within the Bush administra-
tion: the possession of WMD by unaccountable, unfriendly, despotic governments is itself a
threat that must be countered.”); Norman Podhoretz, In Praise of the Bush Doctrine,
COMMENTARY, Sept. 2002, at 23–24 (“[T]he third [pillar of the Bush Doctrine] was the asser-
tion of [the U.S.] right to preempt.”); Thomas E. Ricks and Vernon Loeb, Bush Developing
Military Policy of Striking First, WASH. POST, Jun. 10, 2002, at A1; Mike Allen and Karen
DeYoung, Bush: U.S. Will Strike First at Enemies, WASH. POST, June 2, 2002, at A1.
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ries of unilateral action despite the passage of Resolution 1441 by the
Security Council.17  The fact that the United States chose to channel
its Iraq policy through the Security Council is significant,18 but it re-
mains questionable whether international law has much effect on cur-
rent U.S. policy.19
The current standoff between the United States and Iraq pres-
ents a useful case study to examine whether, considering the events of
September 11th, these unilateral justifications are legally valid or
whether existing international legal rules and institutions are ade-
quate to address the challenges of the post–September 11th world.
The United States has supplied several reasons for military action,20
and its legal argument seems to have coalesced into a three-step ap-
proach.  The starting point is that the United States already has suffi-
cient authority by virtue of Iraq’s “material breach” of existing Secu-
rity Council resolutions and an independent right of preemptive self-
defense.21  Second, the United States acknowledges that Resolution
1441 requires the Security Council to convene in the event of Iraqi
noncompliance, and, under such circumstances, the United States
would appreciate the unambiguous legal cover that a new resolution
explicitly authorizing force would provide.22  Third, should explicit
17. See President Bush, Remarks on the United Nations Security Council Resolution, su-
pra note 3.
18. See Weisman, supra note 4.
19. See Michael Hirsh, Bush and the World, FOREIGN POLICY, Sept./Oct. 2002, at 20
(“Bush, to judge by his actions, appears to believe in a kind of unilateral civilization . . . the
United Nations is an afterthought, treaties are not considered binding”).
20. President George W. Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly (Sept.
12, 2002), available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2002).  In his speech to the U.N., President Bush advanced several reasons for
action against Iraq within the general context of Iraq’s violation of existing Security Council
resolutions: “[Saddam Hussein] has proven instead only his contempt for the United Nations,
and for all his pledges.  By breaking every pledge—by his deceptions, and by his cruelties—Sad-
dam Hussein has made the case against himself.”
21. See id.
22. See S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441, at 13–14 (2002); Statement by U.S. Ambas-
sador John Negroponte, U.N. Press Release SC/7564 (Nov. 8, 2002), supra note 3 (“The resolu-
tion contained, he said, no ‘hidden triggers’ and no ‘automaticity’ with the use of force.  The
procedure to be followed was laid out in the resolution.  And one way or another, Iraq would be
disarmed.  If the Security Council failed to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violation,
the resolution did not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat
posed by that country, or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world
peace and security.”); Eric Black & Bob von Sternberg, The Case Against Iraq, RALEIGH NEWS
& OBSERVER, Oct. 6, 2002, at 19A (quoting National Security Council spokesman Mike Anton
as saying that because a new resolution would be forthcoming, “[g]oing into any length about
the legal case is not that important.”).
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Security Council authorization for force not follow a report of Iraqi
noncompliance, the United States asserts that it may still act on the
aforementioned bases of existing Security Council resolutions and a
right of preemptive self-defense.23  This final step in the argument also
implies a unilateral right to use force based on the failure of the Secu-
rity Council to fulfill its responsibility to maintain international peace
and security.24  Thus, despite the passage of Resolution 1441, ambigui-
ties still exist as to the legality of force against Iraq, and the United
States purports that several justifications exist in parallel.
A thorough inquiry must evaluate these different arguments to
determine whether they, individually or in the aggregate, give the
United States a right to use force without new and explicit authoriza-
tion from the Security Council or an armed attack by Iraq.  Part II
discusses the possibility that the United States is implicitly authorized
to use force because of Iraq’s violation of its obligations under UN
Security Council resolutions.25  Part III examines whether the failure
of the UN Security Council to deal with the threat to international
peace and security posed by Saddam’s regime gives rise to a unilateral
right of intervention.26  Part IV reviews the international law govern-
ing states’ rights of self-defense and evaluates whether those rules or
an emerging rule allows the United States to exercise a right of pre-
emptive self-defense.  The United States asserts this right in response
to the threat posed by Iraq itself, i.e., its aggressive tendencies com-
bined with its pursuit of WMD,27 as well as Iraq’s support of terror-
ism, including the possibility that Iraq may provide terrorists with
WMD for use against the United States. 28  Part IV also proposes a
new rule that attempts to provide a mechanism for dealing with
23. See Statement by U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte, U.N. Press Release SC/7564 (Nov.
8, 2002), supra note 3.
24. Id. (“If the Security Council failed to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi viola-
tion, the resolution did not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the
threat posed by that country, or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect
world peace and security.”) (emphasis added).
25. President Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 20.
26. Id. (“Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding or will it be irrele-
vant?”).
27. Id. (“Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger.  To assume this re-
gime’s good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble.
And this is a risk we must not take.”).
28. Id. (“And if an emboldened [Iraqi] regime were to supply these weapons [of mass de-
struction] to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September 11th would be a prelude to far
greater horrors.”).
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threats like Iraq that are inadequately addressed by the existing legal
regime without surrendering completely to the discretion of individ-
ual states.
B. The Sources of International Law and the Capacity for Change
In order to evaluate the U.S. legal arguments, it is important to
be aware of the nature of the applicable rules of international law and
their capacity for change.  The United Nations Charter is the primary
source of international law governing the use of force.29  Article 2(4)
of the Charter generally prohibits the threat or use of force,30 a prohi-
bition qualified by uses of force authorized by the Security Council
under Article 4231 or as self-defense “if an armed attack occurs.”32  In
the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice identified the
need to supplement the Charter provisions with customary interna-
tional law.33
Customary international law consists of state practice and opinio
juris.34  Opinio juris can be generally understood as a sense of obliga-
tion that gives legal relevance to certain instances of state practice.35
Most scholars agree that state practice consists of the actions and
statements of states.36  State practice need not be uniform to create a
rule of customary international law, but a customary rule cannot be
created if a large amount of state practice is in conflict with the pur-
ported rule.37
According to Professor Gray, a statement of condemnation by
the Security Council or the General Assembly constitutes collective
29. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE 2, 5 (2002).
30. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
31. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
33. Nicaragua v. United States of America, 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 176 (June 27); CHRISTINE
GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 4 (2000).
34. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 39 (7th ed. 1997).  See also Michael Byers, The Shifting Foundations of International Law:
A Decade of Forceful Measures against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 21, 28 (2002) (discussing the
appropriate methodology for determining whether a right of unilateral humanitarian interven-
tion exists).  But see FRANCK, supra note 29, at 191 n.40 (impugning the relevance of opinio juris
when reviewing the reaction of the Security Council or General Assembly to a particular use of
force).
35. See MALANCZUK, supra note 34, at 44.
36. See Byers, supra note 34, at 30 (contrasting this prevailing view with that of writers such
as Anthony D’Amato who insist that only physical acts constitute state practice).
37. MALANCZUK, supra note 34, at 40.
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state practice that strongly indicates the illegality of a particular use of
force.38  In its 1971 Namibia Advisory Opinion, the International
Court of Justice urged that the effect of a Security Council resolution
must be drawn in large part from its language.39  This approach is not
as strict as the rule governing treaty interpretation, but it appears
somewhat similar to the fundamental rule that treaties be interpreted
“in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and
purpose.”40
Professor Thomas M. Franck argues that the meaning of the
Charter can change through state practice: “the Charter will be sub-
jected to continuous interpretation and adaptation through the mem-
ber states’ individual and collective practice: their actions, voting, and
rhetoric.”41  The prohibition on the use of force, however, is a rule
widely regarded as possessing the character of jus cogens, a legal prin-
ciple so fundamental that states are not permitted to derogate from
it.42  Modifications of rules with the status of jus cogens are generally
thought to require a higher standard of consistent state practice and
opinio juris than other rules.43
Professor Byers identifies difficult issues that remain as to the
relative significance that should be accorded to state practice; issues
that have been brought to the fore by U.S. military action in the post–
Cold War era.  Are actions more powerful than statements?44  Has the
principle of sovereign equality eroded to the extent that the practice
of a more powerful state is more significant than the practice of a less
powerful state?45  Is the legality of an action supported if states fail to
condemn the action or provide only muted criticism?46  These issues
cannot be resolved in this paper.  Suffice to say that the U.S. and in-
ternational law commentators who tend to support the legality of its
38. GRAY, supra note 33, at 15.
39. 1971 I.C.J. 15, ¶ 53 (Jan. 29) (“The language of a resolution of the Security Council
should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect.”).
40. Byers, supra note 34, at 21, 23 (quoting art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331 (1969)).
41. FRANCK, supra note 29, at 7–8 (illustrating his point by referring to the practice of in-
terpreting abstentions by Security Council as not constituting a veto).
42. See GRAY, supra note 33, at 24.
43. Byers, supra note 34, at 35.
44. Id. at 31.
45. Id. at 32.
46. See id. at 35–36.
MCLAIN (FIXED).DOC 03/20/03  2:20 PM
2003] JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ 241
actions generally support an approach to international legal sources
that, as Professor Ian Brownlie describes, “involves maximizing the
occasions when the powerful actor will obtain ‘legal approval’ for its
actions and minimizing the occasions when approval may be con-
spicuously withheld.”47  The opposing view, which coincides with the
interests of less powerful states, favors a stricter interpretation of the
operative language of the Charter and Security Council resolutions
and a high standard for changes in customary international law.48  The
current dialogue about Iraq is then a debate about the content and
foundations of the law and its application to a particular circum-
stance.
II.  USE OF FORCE UNDER AUTHORITY OF
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
A. A Brief Survey of Events from the Gulf War to the Present
Before addressing the current situation, it is helpful to review the
relevant events that followed the Persian Gulf War of 1990–91.  On
August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait.49  The United Na-
tions Security Council responded by passing Resolution 660, which
declared a breach of international peace and security and demanded
Iraq’s immediate withdrawal from Kuwait.50  The Security Council
also passed Resolution 661, imposing sanctions on Iraq and reaffirm-
ing its commitment to Resolution 660.51  Eventually, the Security
Council found it necessary to pass Resolution 678, authorizing Mem-
47. Ian Brownlie, International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 255
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 49 (1995–I).  For examples of commentators using an expansive pur-
posive approach to the rules governing the use of force, see generally FRANCK, supra note 69, at
107 (often looking beyond the failure of states to express support for armed interventions to
circumstances suggesting their approval or acquiescence; for instance, characterizing the state
practice regarding anticipatory self-defense as ambiguous); Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement
of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of Force Against Iraq’s Weapons of Mass De-
struction, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 725 (1998) (arguing that the prohibition on the use of force did not
preclude the reactivation of coalition forces’ authorization to use force under Resolution 678
upon Iraq’s “material breach” of Resolution 687).
48. See generally GRAY, supra note 33.  For example, unlike Franck’s view of anticipatory
self-defense, Gray interprets the lack of explicit support for the theory not as a sign of ambiguity
but as “a clear indication of the doubtful status of this justification for the use of force.”  Id. at
112.
49. See POLLACK, supra note 12, at 36–37.
50. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990).
51. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661, at 1–2 (1990).
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ber States cooperating with Kuwait to use “all necessary means” to
implement Resolution 660.52  On January 17, 1991, a United States–
led coalition of states commenced hostilities against Iraq.  Following
weeks of aerial bombardment and a 100-hour ground campaign, Iraq
agreed to a cease-fire on February 28th.53
The debates in the Security Council reveal that Resolution 678
clearly contemplated the use of force by Member States against Iraq.54
Despite the fact that Resolution 678 referred to Chapter VII, some
controversy arose over the legal basis for the coalition action and the
lack of UN control over the operation.55  Ambiguity exists as to
whether the Security Council was acting under the authority of Arti-
cle 42 of the UN Charter in particular, Chapter VII generally, or ap-
proving the exercise of collective self-defense by the participating
states.56  As compared with later events, however, the intervention by
the United States–led coalition during the Gulf War appears well
grounded in Security Council authorization.
The United States used pre– and post–cease-fire Security Coun-
cil resolutions to justify the majority of its military interventions in
Iraq over the next decade.  To legitimize these interventions, the
United States claimed that the various Security Council resolutions
gave rise to implied authorizations for the use of force.57  Aside from
the June 26, 1993, forcible response to a plot to assassinate former
President George H.W. Bush,58 the United States military interven-
tions can be classified into two groups: (1) those justified as penalizing
Iraqi non-compliance with Resolution 688, which demands an end to
repression of Kurdish and Shi’ite minority groups; and (2) those justi-
fied as penalizing Iraqi non-compliance with Resolution 687, which
requires Iraq to submit to the internationally supervised destruction
of its WMD.  These Security Council resolutions were inadequate as
52. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678, at 1 (1990).
53. See POLLACK, supra note 12, at 44–46.
54. GRAY, supra note 33, at 153.
55. Id. at 154.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 191.
58. See Federation of American Scientists, Operation Southern Watch, at http://www.fas.
org/man/dod-101/ops/southern_watch.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2002).  The Clinton administra-
tion learned of a failed attempt to assassinate former President Bush during his April 1993 visit
to Kuwait.  On June 26, 1993, U.S. warships launched 23 cruise missiles at the principal head-
quarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, which was charged with planning the assassination
attempt.  16 missiles hit the target.  Three landed in a residential area, killing at least nine civil-
ians.  See also GRAY, supra note 33, at 117.
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justification for past U.S. interventions in Iraq, however.  Resolution
1441 recently joined these resolutions, and is notable for its deliberate
ambiguity.59
By finding Iraq to be in “material breach,” Resolution 1441 rep-
resents a concession by the other members of the Security Council to
allow the United States to make the strongest case yet for implied
authorization for force.60  The problem remains that, like Resolutions
688 and 687, Resolution 1441 contains no explicit authorization.  Con-
sidered in light of the general prohibition on the use of force, there is
a strong case that conscious inclusion of “material breach” neverthe-
less fails to activate a unilateral right of intervention.
1. Resolution 688, Safe Havens, No-fly Zones, and Desert Strike.
The Gulf War cease-fire gave way in March 1991 to revolts by ele-
ments of the Kurdish population in northern Iraq and Shi’ite groups
in the south.61  Saddam Hussein’s regime displayed considerable re-
siliency in recovering from its Gulf War defeat to brutally suppress
the majority of the resistance within the month.62  The Security Coun-
cil responded by passing Resolution 688.  It condemned the repres-
sion of Kurds and Shi’ites, demanded that Iraq end its repression of
these groups, and called on Iraq to allow access to international hu-
manitarian organizations.63  Resolution 688 does not directly invoke
Chapter VII and did not explicitly authorize force to implement its
demands.  Nevertheless, the United States, United Kingdom, and
France used Resolution 688 to support the establishment of safe ha-
vens and the subsequent imposition of no-fly zones over the northern
and southern thirds of Iraq’s territory.64  Beginning in August 1992,
the United Kingdom gradually articulated an additional justification
for the intervention based on a putative right of humanitarian inter-
vention.65
Since the institution of no-fly zones, clashes between U.S. and
British warplanes and Iraqi anti-aircraft defenses have become com-
monplace.66  The United States cited Resolution 688 as authorization
59. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002).
60. See Weisman, supra note 4.
61. POLLACK, supra note 12, at 47–51.
62. Id. at 50–51.
63. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688, at 2 (1991); GRAY, supra note 33, at 191.
64. GRAY, supra note 33, at 191.
65. Id. at 29.
66. See id. at 30.
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for forcible measures against Iraqi air defenses, even though the
resolution does not authorize such use of force.67  The sporadic
clashes were punctuated in September 1996, by Operation Desert
Strike, the largest U.S. intervention under color of Resolution 688.68
Although the focus of the U.S. legal argument for action against Iraq
seems to be on the Resolution 687/678 material breach theory,69 the
United States has cited compliance with Resolution 688 as one of the
conditions for a peaceful resolution to the standoff.70  Moreover,
Resolution 1441 lists Resolution 688 as one of the “relevant resolu-
tions” materially breached by Iraq.71  Nevertheless, the conduct of
Desert Strike and the response of the Security Council offer little
support, if any, to the proposition that international law permits one
or two states to enforce Security Council resolutions without express
authorization.
In late August 1996, Iraq intervened on the side of the Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP) in a conflict between the KDP and the other
main Kurdish militia group, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK).72  Roughly thirty thousand Iraqi troops moved against areas
held by the PUK and the Iraqi National Congress.73  Though Iraq’s
actions against elements of the Kurdish minority seemed to constitute
a clear violation of Resolution 688, the subsequent U.S. action was
merely punitive in nature and did not directly protect the Kurds from
Iraqi government repression.74  The United States fired 44 cruise mis-
siles against air defense and command and control targets in southern
Iraq.  In addition, U.S. and British forces expanded the southern no-
67. Id. at 29.
68. Federation of American Scientists, supra note 58.
69. See Part II(B) & (C), infra.
70. See President Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 20
(“If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will cease persecution of its civilian population, including
Shi’a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkomans and others—again as required by Security Council resolu-
tions.”).
71. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441, at 1 (2002) (referring to “relevant resolutions”
listed in the preamble, which include Resolution 688).
72. POLLACK, supra note 12, at 81–83.
73. Alain E. Boileau, Note & Comment, To the Suburbs of Baghdad: Clinton’s Extension
of the Southern Iraqi No-Fly Zone, 3 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 875, 879 (1997); POLLACK, su-
pra note 12, at 82.
74. Boileau, supra note 73; POLLACK, supra note 12, at 82 (“[T]he administration opted to
mount a sizable air campaign against a range of targets, mostly in southern Iraq . . . to demon-
strate to Saddam that he would pay a price for any aggression.”).
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fly zone northward from the 32nd to the 33rd parallel.75  Explaining
the action, President Clinton explicitly identified the practical reasons
for the intervention, but was silent as to the relationship between the
plight of the Kurds and the strikes in the south.76  The apparent rea-
son for not striking around the endangered northern areas was the
lack of sufficient forces nearby.77
The actual U.S. response, though attenuated from the humani-
tarian threat and punitive rather than protective, might be considered
a better policy choice than doing nothing.  The response of the Secu-
rity Council does not represent the kind of consistent support that
would seem necessary to establish an implied right of intervention,
however.  Of the Security Council members, only one permanent
member, Great Britain, and three other members, Germany, Canada,
and Japan, offered general support for the intervention.78  France and
Spain criticized the action as a hasty use of force,79 and France soon
withdrew completely from its role in patrolling the no-fly zones.80
Meanwhile, Russia denounced the action as an “absolutely impermis-
sible” unilateral use of force.81  The objections to Desert Strike, espe-
cially by France which had initially been a partner in protecting the
Kurds, illustrate the tenuous legal basis that Resolution 688 would of-
fer a major U.S. intervention in Iraq today.
The frequency and scope of clashes in the no-fly zones increased
after the United States and Britain expanded the rules of engagement
for their aircrews in December of 1998.82  Renewed Russian and Chi-
nese protests were joined by a call from the Arab League to halt all
activity not authorized by the Security Council.83  The United States
countered by reiterating that its actions were taken in support of, and
in accordance with, Resolution 688.84
75. Federation of American Scientists, supra note 58.
76. See Michael Cornell, Comment, A Decade of Failure: The Legality and Efficacy of
United Nations Actions in the Elimination of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, 16 CONN. J.
INT’L L. 325, 354 (2001).
77. POLLACK, supra note 12, at 82.
78. Boileau, supra note 73, at 890–91.
79. Id. at 891.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. GRAY, supra note 33, at 191.
83. Id. at 191–92.
84. See U.N. Press Release SC/6683 (May 21, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/ docs/1999/19990521.Sc66883.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2002).
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2. Resolution 687, the Weapons Inspection Regime, and Desert
Fox.  Passed in connection with the Gulf War cease-fire, Resolution
687 requires the destruction of Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nu-
clear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles as well as Iraq’s com-
mitment not to develop such weapons in the future.85  Iraq’s compli-
ance with Resolution 687 is a condition for lifting of the economic
sanctions imposed by Resolution 661.86  Resolution 687 led to the
creation of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and an Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection team to monitor
and verify Iraq’s disarmament.87
Iraq repeatedly claimed to have complied with its disarmament
obligations, but UNSCOM has repeatedly found Iraq to be conceal-
ing its weapons.88  The United States and Britain responded to Iraq’s
intransigence with military intervention on two occasions.89  The first
incident consisted of cruise missile strikes on January 17, 1993.90  In
the following years, Iraq responded to the inspection efforts with a
pattern of obstruction, deception, and bullying.91  Iraq alleged that it
had disclosed all information on its weapons programs on numerous
occasions, trying to induce the weapons inspectors to conclude their
work and leave the country for good.92
The suspicions of the weapons inspectors and Western leaders
were confirmed in August, 1995 with the defection of General
85. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687, at 5 (1991).  The Security Council passed Resolu-
tion 687 on April 3, 1991, and Iraq accepted it without condition three days later.  Specifically,
the resolution requires Iraq to “unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering
harmless, under international supervision” of its weapons of mass destruction.  Weapons of
mass destruction include its “ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty
kilometers, and related major parts and repair and production facilities.”  See Cornell, supra
note 76, at 327.
86. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687, at 24, 28 (1991).
87. See Cornell, supra note 76, at 330.  Resolution 699 confirmed that UNSCOM and
IAEA inspectors had authority to implement the arms control provisions of Resolution 687,
Section C.  S.C. Res. 699, U.N. Doc. S/RES/699 (1991).
88. Christine Gray, After the Ceasefire: Iraq, the Security Council and the Use of Force, 65
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 135, 152–54 (1994).
89. GRAY, supra note 33, at 192.
90. See Federation of American Scientists, Cruise Missile Strike—17 January 1993, Apr. 14,
1998, available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/strike_930117.htm (last visited Oct. 26,
2002).  On January 17, 1993, the U.S. launched 46 Block II TLAM-C “Tomahawk” cruise mis-
siles at the Zafraniyah Nuclear Fabrication Facility outside Baghdad.  Most of the missiles hit
the target, but one was apparently struck by Iraqi anti-aircraft fire and crashed into the Al
Rasheed Hotel, killing at least two civilians, possibly more.  Id.
91. See Cornell, supra note 76, at 333–34.
92. Id.
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Hussein Kamel, head of all of Iraq’s weapons programs.93  Kamel dis-
closed Iraq’s efforts to conceal the dimensions of its weapons pro-
grams, which included a persistent nuclear weapons program.94  In the
aftermath of Kamel’s defection, Iraq admitted to having maintained
an extensive biological weapons program and achieving significant
advances in its ballistic missile development.95
The inspections program then proceeded sporadically, until dete-
riorating completely in 1998.96  The Security Council passed Resolu-
tion 1154 on March 2, 1998, explicitly linking weapons inspection
compliance with fulfillment of Resolution 687 and threatening the
most severe consequences for continued non-compliance.97  The
United States had been trying since November 1997 to obtain Secu-
rity Council authorization for force in response to Iraqi intransi-
gence.98  While Resolution 1154 threatened severe consequences,
China, France, and Russia declared that it did not authorize force.99
In addition to its failure to obtain a resolution authorizing force,100 the
U.S. government’s efforts to secure authorization undermine the
proposition that existing resolutions already provided a sufficient le-
gal basis for the use of force.
Iraq continued to obstruct the inspection process, and in Sep-
tember of 1998 the Security Council passed Resolution 1205, which
expressed alarm at Iraq’s failure to comply and demanded that Iraq
reverse its position.101  Iraq eventually responded to UN pressure, not
with compliance, but by ceasing all cooperation with UNSCOM that
December.102  This action precipitated a crisis resulting in Operation
Desert Fox, the largest U.S. military action against Iraq since the Gulf
War.
93. Frontline: Spying on Saddam, P.B.S. ONLINE (1999), at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/unscom/experts/defectors.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2002).
94. See Cornell, supra note 76, at 333–34.
95. Id.
96. See GRAY, supra note 33, at 192.
97. S.C. Res. 1154, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1154, at 2 (1998).
98. Remarks by Paul C. Szasz, Legal Authority for the Possible Use of Force Against Iraq,
92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 136, 141 (1998).
99. Id. at 140–41.
100. Id. at 141.
101. S.C. Res. 1205, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1205, at 2 (1998).
102. BBC News, Timeline: Iraq (Aug. 2, 2002), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ mid-
dle_east/ 737483.stm (last visited Sept. 23, 2002).
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In early December 1998, UNSCOM evacuated its staff from Iraq
in response to the Iraqi government’s continued obstruction of weap-
ons inspections.103  The United States demanded that Iraq allow them
to reenter, but Iraq refused.  On December 16, 1998, the United
States and United Kingdom commenced Operation Desert Fox,
which consisted of four days of cruise missile strikes on missile facto-
ries, command centers and airfields.104  The British legal justification
alleged that Iraq was in material breach of Resolution 687, and the
United States similarly asserted that its actions were authorized by
existing resolutions.105  In contemporaneous Security Council debates,
the majority of states rejected the legality of the intervention.106  The
response of the Security Council thus prevented the formation of a
rule granting implied authorization to the United States and United
Kingdom to enforce Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolu-
tions.  The material breach theory retained sufficient support that the
term “material breach” was eventually included in Resolution 1441 in
2002, however.107  A review of the theory reveals that it contains
flawed premises which prevent even the explicit use of the term from
affirming the existence of a unilateral right of enforcement.
According to the material breach theory, the cessation of hostili-
ties provided for in Resolution 687 was predicated on Iraq’s accep-
tance of and compliance with the obligations contained therein.  With
a material breach of Resolution 687, proponents of the material
breach theory conclude that the cessation of hostilities is revoked,
and the “all necessary means” provision of Resolution 678 is reacti-
vated.  Resolution 678 authorized Member States co-operating with
Kuwait to “use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolu-
tion 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore
international peace and security to the area.”108
Thus, in providing material breach as a legal foundation for Des-
ert Fox, the United States and United Kingdom were forced to argue
that in 1990, before the primary obligations at issue had even been
imposed on Iraq, the Security Council granted a right of unilateral
military action against Iraq that could last through 1998 and beyond,
103. Id.; POLLACK, supra note 12, at 92.
104. BBC News, supra note 102.
105. GRAY, supra note 33, at 192.
106. Id.
107. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441, at 1 (2002).
108. Cornell, supra note 76, at 355.
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even after Iraq had been expelled from Kuwait.  As a noted advocate
of the material breach theory, Professor Ruth Wedgwood supported
unilateral U.S. action on the grounds that the conditional nature of
the 1991 cease-fire agreement, a cease-fire recognized in Resolution
687, enabled the United States to suspend the agreement upon mate-
rial breach and resume military operations.  It may comport with ba-
sic contract principles to argue that Iraq should not receive the bene-
fits of the cease-fire while violating its principal provisions, but a
detailed review of the argument reveals its flaws and tenuous assump-
tions.
Perhaps the most convincing argument against the theory of ma-
terial breach is the actual language of Resolution 687.  The resolution
declares that a formal cease-fire “between Iraq and Kuwait and the
Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolu-
tion 678,” would become effective with Iraq’s notification to the Sec-
retary-General and the Security Council of its acceptance of the pro-
visions of 687.109  According to this language, the Security Council
seems to act as an intermediary between the Gulf War antagonists.
This might allow one to argue that the right of enforcement of the
cease-fire arrangements accrues to a Member State cooperating with
Kuwait, but the last paragraph of Resolution 687 vests the authority
for its enforcement in the Security Council.110  In paragraph 34 of the
resolution, the Security Council “[d]ecides to remain seized of the
matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the im-
plementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and secu-
rity in the region.”111  In short, Resolution 687 does not provide for a
right of unilateral intervention that vests upon a breach by Iraq nor is
it silent on the issue of authority to enforce its provisions.  Instead,
Resolution 687 explicitly provides that the Security Council will
evaluate how best to implement the resolution and to secure peace
and security in the region.112  Unilateral U.S. efforts to coerce Iraqi
compliance with Resolution 687 have been at odds with the approach
prescribed by the resolution itself.
Moving beyond the language of Resolution 687 to its supposed
purpose does little to support the theory of material breach.  On the
question of whether Iraq’s material failure to fulfill its cease-fire obli-
109. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687, at 33 (1991).
110. Id. at 34 (1991).  See Cornell, supra note 76, at 357.
111. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687, at 34 (1991).
112. Id. at 34 (1991).
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gations automatically revives authorization for armed intervention,
Professor Wedgwood’s argument incorrectly assumes that the pre-
Charter doctrine that material breach of a cease-fire allows an injured
party to resume hostilities has survived in parallel with the Article
2(4) prohibition on the use of force.113  It is more consistent with the
language and purpose of the Charter to take the view that Article
2(4) fundamentally altered armistice doctrine.  States are thus re-
quired to refrain from the use of force even if a counter-party com-
mits a material breach of a cease-fire agreement short of an armed at-
tack.114  The explicit adoption by Resolution 1441 of the term
“material breach”115 has given greater weight to Professor Wedg-
wood’s theory, but, as discussed below, not enough weight to justify
implied enforcement of relevant Security Council resolutions.
Another critical premise in the material breach argument for the
Desert Fox intervention was including Resolution 687 in the group of
‘subsequent resolutions’ referred to by Resolution 678.  Resolution
678 was passed in 1990 primarily to make way for the coalition mili-
tary action that ejected Iraq from Kuwait and remedied the primary
breach of international peace and security.  If the majority of Iraqi
violations constituting the material breach are breaches of specific
provisions of Resolution 687 or other post-678 resolutions (and Presi-
dent Bush seemed to focus on Iraq’s violations of Resolution 687 in
his address to the United Nations),116 proponents of material breach
theory are forced to argue that Resolution 678 authorized the use of
force not only to implement Resolution 660 and other relevant reso-
lutions leading up through 678, but also to enforce obligations that at
the time had neither been offered by the Security Council nor ac-
cepted by Iraq.  Such an approach seems speculative and far-fetched.
Resolution 678 does authorize states to “restore international
peace and security to the area,” but, coming as it does after the spe-
cific language regarding enforcement of Resolution 660 and other
resolutions, it seems more like a catchall provision to provide suffi-
cient authorization for the liberation of Kuwait and any related ac-
113. Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authoriza-
tions to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 124, 144
(1999).
114. Id.; David M. Morriss, From War to Peace: A Study of Cease-Fire Agreements and the
Evolving Role of the United Nations, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 802, 822–23 (1996).
115. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441, at 1 (2002).
116. See generally President Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra
note 20.
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tions.  It is unlikely that the provision was intended to authorize force
after the liberation of Kuwait for an indefinite period until Iraq com-
plied with obligations that were not yet in existence.
Aside from flaws in the material breach theory, the specific facts
of the Gulf War cease-fire weigh against an argument for unilateral
enforcement.  Resolution 686 clearly contemplated a temporary
cease-fire and stated explicitly that Resolution 678 would remain in
force until Iraq complied with the terms of 686.117  Resolution 687 con-
tained no such provision: it instituted a permanent cease-fire that be-
came effective with Iraqi acceptance of the agreement and was not
contingent on Iraqi compliance.118  It is particularly telling that the Se-
curity Council rejected a U.S. proposal that would have authorized
force if Iraq failed to comply with the cease-fire provisions.119
When this is taken into consideration, it is apparent that the U.S.
government could not rely on the “all necessary means” provision of
Resolution 678, a resolution passed roughly eight years earlier to al-
low for the imminent expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait.  This view of the
resolutions and their surrounding circumstances is not only the most
reasonable interpretation; it is in harmony with the object and pur-
pose of the UN Charter, which installed the Security Council, not
great power subcontractors, as the primary manager of armed force in
the international system.120  Iraq should be penalized for its breach of
the cease-fire, but it does not follow that a single state should be al-
lowed to unilaterally craft and implement the punishment based on
both its own estimation of the situation and its own political interests.
Professor Wedgwood also argued that unilateral U.S. action was
justified because the prior practice of the UNSCOM regime was to
rely on the threat and use of U.S. force to ensure Iraq’s compliance.121
The Security Council has shown itself to be an organic and increas-
ingly non-formalistic institution.  Thus, an argument like Professor
Wedgwood’s “prior practice” argument is worth considering.  In 1993,
the President of the Security Council responded to Iraq’s interference
with inspections that threatened Iraq with “serious consequences” for
117. S.C. Res. 686, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (1991).
118. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991); see also Lobel & Ratner, supra note 113, at
149.
119. Lobel & Ratner, supra note 113, at 149.
120. See id. at 134.
121. See Wedgwood, supra note 47, at 725.
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its “continued defiance.” 122  Without any new authorizing resolution,
coalition forces launched air strikes against Iraq.123  Professor Wedg-
wood offers this symbiotic interaction between the Security Council
and the United States–led coalition in 1993 as evidence corroborating
a custom that obviated the need for a new authorizing resolution in
1998.124  This, of course, ignores the practice of Security Council
members in the intervening years, when support for United States–
led enforcement measures steadily eroded.  If Professor Wedgwood’s
argument is based on practice and custom, then it would be possible
for subsequent practice to foreclose action that, for the sake of argu-
ment, would have been considered valid in 1993.  The practice of a
majority of Council members in 1998, including China, France, and
Russia, was that even a new, saber-rattling resolution such as Resolu-
tion 1154 (threatening Iraq with the “severest consequences” for non-
compliance) was insufficient to act as “automatic authorization of the
use of force against Iraq.”125  If there were any remaining possibility
that Desert Fox was authorized by state practice subsequent to
Resolution 687, it is foreclosed by the fact that a majority of the
members of the Security Council rejected the legality of the action.126
The arguments of the U.S. government and scholars like Profes-
sor Wedgwood probably seem attractive to anxious Americans who
fear a catastrophic terrorist attack.  The United States, however, like
all other states, is bound by a general prohibition on the use of force
that is contained in the UN Charter.127  Such a prohibition may be ill-
advised in a violent world, but it persists nevertheless.  Unless we are
to scuttle the current international legal order, it must weigh heavily
in situations where overly creative arguments are advanced to justify
the use of force.  Where there is a conflict between Article 2(4) of the
UN Charter and the quasi-contractual theory of material breach, Ar-
ticle 2(4) should prevail.
122. Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25091, at 2 (1993).
123. Wedgwood, supra note 47, at 727.
124. Id. at 728.
125. See Statement of China, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3858, at 14 (1998); see also Lobel & Ratner,
supra note 113, at 124.
126. GRAY, supra note 33, at 192.
127. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
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B. Resolution 1441 and the Legality of a Future Forcible
Intervention
If getting the UNSCOM inspectors back into Iraq was the goal of
Operation Desert Fox, the operation was a failure.128  Signaling the
failure of forcible intervention to bring about Iraq’s compliance with
Resolution 687, the Security Council passed Resolution 1284 on De-
cember 17, 1999, which replaced UNSCOM with the UN Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).129  Three of
the five permanent members of the Security Council, China, France,
and Russia, abstained from the vote.130  The inspections regime lay
dormant until the autumn of 2002, when a vigorous new U.S. initia-
tive toward Iraq resulted in the passage of Resolution 1441.131  Given
the divisiveness of the Iraq issue over the years, it is surprising that
Resolution 1441 passed with a unanimous vote of 15–0, including
Syria.132
The text of Resolution 1441 is notable for several reasons.  First,
it invokes Chapter VII of the UN Charter and recognizes that Iraq’s
non-compliance with its inspection obligations and its WMD prolif-
eration activities constitute a threat to international peace and secu-
rity.  Second, the Council specifically invokes the language of material
breach when it
[d]ecides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its
obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687
(1991), in particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United
Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions re-
quired under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991); including
Resolution 687. 133
Third, the resolution places the burden of proof on Iraq to affirma-
tively demonstrate that it does not possess WMD or related materi-
128. BBC News, supra note 102.
129. S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (1999).
130. Security Council Establishes New Monitoring Commission for Iraq Adopting Resolution
1284 (1999) by vote of 11–0–4, Press Release, U.N. Doc. SC/6775 (Dec. 17, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19991217.sc6775.doc.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2002).
131. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002).
132. See Weisman, supra note 4 (describing the 15–0 vote as “extraordinary”).
133. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002) (“Recalling all its previous relevant
resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November
1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707
(1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284
(1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President, Recalling also its
resolution 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001 and its intention to implement it fully”).
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als,134 and provides that “false statements or omissions in the declara-
tions submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq
at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation
of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach.”135
Fourth, it gives the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection personnel wide
latitude to inspect any site and to interview any person in Iraq, in-
cluding the authority to remove an interviewee and his or her family
from Iraq.136  Fifth, it forbids Iraq from taking or threatening “hostile
acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United
Nations or the IAEA or of any Member State taking action to uphold
any Council resolution.”137
Sixth, if Iraq is found to be in violation by making a false state-
ment or omission in its mandatory disclosure or if the Council re-
ceives a report from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC or the
Director-General of the IAEA of any Iraqi interference or failure to
comply with its disarmament obligations, the Council has decided “to
convene immediately . . . in order to consider the situation and the
need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in
order to secure international peace and security.”138  Such violations
will be considered with the understanding that “the Council has re-
peatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result
of its continued violations of its obligations.”139
Finally, Resolution 1441 is notable for what it does not include,
namely, an authorization for Member States to use “all necessary
means” to ensure compliance.  This omission did not result from a
lack of effort by the United States to include the language.  Facing
opposition by France and other states to a resolution that provided
automatic authorization for the use of force in the event of Iraqi non-
compliance, the United States agreed to let the resolution proceed
without the clear “all necessary means” language.140
134. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441, at 3, 4 (2002).
135. Id. at 4.
136. Id. at 5.
137. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 12.
139. Id. at 13.
140. Weisman, supra note 4 (“Although the United States wanted a strong resolution, Sec-
retary Powell made important concessions to the French and others to get their support.  First,
the administration dropped its insistence on calling for “all necessary means” to enforce its
terms, code for military force.  In addition, the Americans sought to accommodate the French
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Subsequent interpretations of the resolution demonstrate how
the drafting process deliberately left the issue of enforcement am-
biguous.141  The resolution invokes the term “material breach,” but
the effect of that term is undermined by the conspicuous absence of
the “all necessary means” language and a non-automatic procedure
for enforcement.  U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN John
Negroponte admitted that, in the event of Iraqi noncompliance with
1441, there were no hidden triggers or automatic authorizations for
force.  Instead, the Council is to consider the matter in accordance
with the resolution.142  Both Ambassador Negroponte and President
Bush maintained, however, that if the Security Council fails to en-
force compliance, the United States would then be able to intervene
to enforce the resolutions and defend itself.143  Under this conception
of Resolution 1441, the convening of the Security Council is little
more than a formality; force may be used even if the Council decides
not to authorize it.  The United States apparently finds a meaningful
difference between automatic recourse to force, which was rejected in
the drafting of Resolution 1441, and recourse to force after the Secu-
rity Council has fulfilled a mere procedural obligation to convene.
This distinction is strained at best, and it also seems to conflict with
the views of most other Security Council members.
France believed that the non-automatic, two-stage approach was
meant “to ensure that the Security Council maintains control of the
process at each stage.”144  It is hard to see how the Security Council
would maintain control if the United States could use force regardless
of what the Council decides.  Russia emphatically stated that “the
resolution that has just been adopted does not contain any provisions
about automatic use of force,” but did not comment on whether indi-
demand for a two-stage process in which the Security Council would have to be convened to
discuss what to do if Iraq rebuffed the inspectors or was shown to have illegal weapons.”).
141. Id. (describing how the U.S. exchanged the explicit “all necessary means” language for
“little triggers” for force, such as Iraq’s continuing material breach and the potential for Iraqi
misstatements or omissions to constitute a further material breach).
142. Statement by U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte, U.N. Press Release SC/7564 (Nov. 8,
2002), supra note 3.
143. Id. (“If the Security Council failed to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi viola-
tion, the resolution did not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the
threat posed by that country, or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect
world peace and security.”); President Bush, Remarks on the United Nations Security Council
Resolution, supra note 3.
144. The Rationale for the U.N. Resolution on Iraq, in the Diplomats’ Own Words, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at A10 (statement by Ambassador Jean-David Levitte of France).
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vidual states could use force if the Security Council met and did not
provide authorization.145  Syria stated that it received reassurance
from the United States, United Kingdom, France and Russia that
Resolution 1441 “would not be used as a pretext to strike Iraq, and
does not constitute a basis for any automatic strikes against Iraq.”146
No other state affirmed the U.S. view that Member States could use
force if the Security Council failed to provide explicit authorization.147
Proponents of the U.S. view might argue that, in spite of the lack
of explicit support for the U.S. interpretation of Resolution 1441, the
consent of the Council to include the “material breach” language con-
stituted a tacit acknowledgement that the United States could use
force if the Council failed to act.  Such an approach purports to alter
the jus cogens prohibition on the use of force on the basis of a largely
imperceptible—and possibly nonexistent—agreement among the
members of the Council that finds little support in the resolution or
the statements of the other Council members.  If the Council were to
ultimately concede that “material breach” was included to allow the
United States to use force if the Council demurred, it would set a
dangerous precedent that the subtlest ambiguity in a resolution may
support the use of force.  As Professor Michael Byers and Simon
Chesterman observe, the unrivaled power of the United States may
be substantially lowering the standard for the modification of interna-
tional law;148 perhaps to the extent where a nod and a wink may pro-
vide an exception to the prohibition of the use of force.  As it stands
now, however, Resolution 1441 is unable to compensate for the fail-
ure of earlier resolutions to provide implied authorization for the use
of force against Iraq.
Even if one accepts, arguendo, the U.S. position that Resolution
678 allows for unilateral military action to enforce its provisions, the
likely U.S. intervention would be of such a scope as to overwhelm any
145. Id. (statement by Ambassador Sergey Lavrov of Russia).
146. Id. (statement by Deputy Representative Fayssal Mekdad of Syria).
147. See id. (the United Kingdom only expressed its expectation that the U.N. would take
action in the event of Iraqi noncompliance); U.N. Press Release SC/7564 (Nov. 8, 2002), supra
note 3.
148. See Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, Changing the rules about rules?  Unilateral
humanitarian intervention and the future of international law, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 192 (Holzgrefe & Keohane eds.,
forthcoming 2003) (“The United States, and at least some authors, may also be seeking a degree
of formal recognition for the greater influence of the actions and opinions of powerful states in
the formation of customary international law”).
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suggestion that it was intended to ensure compliance with the weap-
ons inspection regime,149 thus undermining the premise of the inter-
vention.  Forcible U.S. intervention will likely be pursued to bring
about a comprehensive regime-change in Iraq; to affect an end-game
to the costly standoff between Saddam Hussein and the United
States.150  U.S. practice in the conduct of the Gulf War reveals the in-
ternal inconsistency of such a policy.
The active provision in Resolution 678 is the permission for
Member States to use “all necessary means” to ensure compliance
with the Security Council resolutions.151  The United States–led coali-
tion forces did not continue their offensive through to Baghdad, how-
ever, in part because such a move would have exceeded their UN
mandate.152  Kenneth Pollack’s description of the decision to conclude
the Gulf War is illuminating:
[T]here was little question that coalition forces could have taken
Baghdad, and done so quickly.  But the Bush administration chose
not to.  In fact, as President Bush and his national security adviser,
Brent Scowcroft, have written, they never believed it was an option:
the mandate from the United Nations was to liberate Kuwait.  Nei-
ther the coalition nor the American people were prepared to
change the government of Iraq by force.153
If the “all necessary means” provision of Resolution 678 did not per-
mit the forcible removal of Hussein from power in the course of Ku-
149. See Television Interview by Jim Lehrer with Condoleeza Rice, U.S. National Security
Adviser, PBS’s Newshour with Jim Lehrer, Mar. 11, 2002  (“We’ve been down this road before,
and there is nothing in Iraq’s past or present that suggests that they’re serious about weapons
inspections that would make clear that they have no weapons of mass destruction.”); see also
television interview by Tim Russert with Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State, NBC’s Meet the
Press, Feb. 17, 2002  (“And until [the weapons development] stops—and, frankly, we believe, as
a U.S. position, until that regime is changed, then his neighbors have much to fear, and we
should be fearful, too, because the weapons he is developing could well fall into the hands of
terrorists who might be able to use them.”).
150. See Peter Slevin, Powell Casts Attack on Iraq as ‘Liberation’, WASH. POST, Sept. 20,
2002, at A20 (describing testimony by Secretary of State Colin Powell to the House Interna-
tional Relations Committee in which Secretary Powell declared that, with regard to U.S. plans
for Iraq, “[w]e understand the implications of such a change-of-regime action.”).
151. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678, at 1 (1990).
152. POLLACK, supra note 12, at 46; Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Con-
flict, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 452, 468 (1991) (“[T]he principles of the Charter require respect for
‘sovereign equality’ and the right of states to political independence and territorial integrity.
These principles and the related Charter purposes may be considered to limit the authority of
the Council to impose a regime on the defeated aggressor, even if the leaders responsible for
aggression and war crimes might be subject to prosecution by victim states.  The people of the
country would still be entitled to self-government and basic political rights.”).
153. POLLACK, supra note 12, at 46.
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wait’s liberation, it does not permit a forcible regime change a decade
later.
* * *
Implied Security Council authorization under the ambit of
Resolution 687 was insufficient to justify Operation Desert Fox, and
it is similarly incapable of supporting future U.S. military intervention
in Iraq.  Resolution 1441 makes implied authorization a somewhat
closer question, but it is still an unconvincing argument in light of the
Council’s conscious decision to omit an explicit “all necessary means”
authorization for force.
III.  AN INDEPENDENT RIGHT TO USE FORCE
ARISING FROM THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
As discussed earlier, existing Security Council resolutions are in-
sufficient to authorize a U.S. military intervention in Iraq.  Many pro-
visions of those resolutions remain unenforced, however, and Saddam
Hussein’s regime apparently continues to starve and repress Iraqi ci-
vilians, develop WMD, and support terrorism.154  Some might argue
that by permitting Saddam’s regime to remain in power, the Security
Council has manifestly failed in its task to ensure international peace
and security.  Such an argument would look to the United States, as
the world’s lone superpower,155 to overcome the failure of the Security
Council and use force unilaterally to topple Saddam’s regime.  The
framers of the UN Charter did not envision a system in which one
state could unilaterally change the government of another state in the
event that the Security Council failed to act.156  Instead they gave the
154. See generally A Decade of Deception and Defiance: Saddam Hussein’s Defiance of the
United Nations, Background Paper for President George W. Bush’s address to the United Na-
tions General Assembly on September 12, 2002 (Sept. 12, 2002), available at www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2002/09/iraqdecade.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2002) (enumerating Iraq’s viola-
tions of its obligations under various Security Council resolutions).
155. Byers, supra note 34, at 39 (discussing the potential that the U.S. would use its super-
power status to create a unique set of legal rules for itself).
156. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE USE
OF FORCE 34 (1993) (“[T]he delegates of the San Francisco Conference were convinced that
force was simply too destructive to be considered an acceptable means of pursuing changes or
advancing other policy.  Force was not to be used to gain territory, to change the government of
another state—no matter how ‘bad’ that government may have been—or even to right a past
‘wrong.’  Such uses of force were considered ‘aggression’ or, as Professor Myres McDougal
terms them, uses of force for ‘value extension,’ and were prohibited.  Instead, force was to be used
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Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security157 and allowed states to act unilaterally
only if they were attacked first by another state.158  Professor Franck
identifies the tension between the Charter’s insistence on a non-
violent order and the imperatives of justice: “[i]n practice, the prob-
lem of injustice in the operation of the Charter has turned out to be
manifest less in unconscionable actions of the Council than in its inac-
tion owing to the veto.”159  In light of the deplorable behavior of Sad-
dam’s regime, the effectiveness of the Security Council can be legiti-
mately questioned.  This section demonstrates, however, that no rule
of customary international law permits the United States to use force
unilaterally to advance its conception of the interests of the interna-
tional community.
Some situations present such a compelling moral or political case
that it is tempting to support intervention even if it violates existing
international law.  With regard to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in
1999, the concept of exceptional illegality would allow the humani-
tarian goals of the intervention to mitigate the unlawful acts.160  Simi-
larly, the international community seems to have benefited from Is-
rael’s unlawful destruction of Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak.  The
past decade of confrontation between the United States and Iraq
would likely have been much more frightening if Israel had not
acted.161  As this confrontation reaches a climax, the Bush Administra-
tion claims that Iraq poses such a grave threat that it will act alone if
the Security Council is unable or unwilling to address the situation.162
Fearing that Iraq may collaborate with a terrorist group such as
al Qaeda,163 or directly attack the United States or Iraq’s neighbors in
only for ‘value conservation,’ for the preservation of the existing political and territorial status
quo, either through the exercise of self-defense or as determined by the Security Council.”) (em-
phasis added).
157. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
158. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
159. FRANCK, supra note 29, at 16.
160. See Byers and Chesterman, supra note 148, at 198–99.
161. See POLLACK, supra note 12, at 369.
162. See President Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 20
(“The purposes of the United States should not be doubted.  The Security Council resolutions
will be enforced—the just demands of peace and security will be met—or action will be un-
avoidable.  And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.”).
163. See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Iraq in Cincinnati, Ohio
(Oct. 7, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html
(last visited Oct. 26, 2002) (“Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists and the instruments of ter-
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the Middle East, the United States has argued that it should not be
forced to sit and wait until Saddam Hussein acquires a nuclear
weapon before it addresses the threat he represents.164  Although the
U.S. position is based in part on a claim of self-defense,165 President
Bush has openly questioned the relevance of the United Nations: “All
the world now faces a test and the United Nations a difficult and de-
fining moment.  Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and
enforced or cast aside without consequence?  Will the United Nations
serve the purpose of its founding or will it be irrelevant?”166  This
statement from the United States implies that the international com-
munity should not be forced to risk a catastrophic attack because of
the institutional shortcomings of the Security Council.  In discussing
Resolution 1441, the United States stated that it would be legitimate
for it to “protect world peace and security” if the Security Council
“failed to act decisively.”167  President Bush reinforced this view in his
response to the passage of Resolution 1441 by the Security Council:
“[i]n confronting this threat, America seeks the support of the world.
If action becomes necessary, we will act in the interests of the
world.”168
The UN Security Council is the institution designated by the UN
Charter to identify and address threats to international peace and se-
curity.169  The Charter enables the Security Council to authorize states
to take forceful measures to enforce its will.170  Given the frequency of
interstate and intrastate conflict since 1945, some observers under-
standably perceive that the UN has failed as a legal regime for regu-
ror, the instruments of mass death and destruction.  And he cannot be trusted.  The risk is sim-
ply too great that he will use them, or provide them to a terror network.”).
164. President Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 20.  See
also POLLACK, supra note 12, at 418 (“This is the problem we face: by the time Saddam truly is
threatening, it will be too late to do anything about it.”).
165. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Sept. 24, 2002), at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
166. President Bush, Address to the U.N. General Assembly, supra note 20.
167. Statement by U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte, U.N. Press Release SC/7564 (Nov. 8,
2002), supra note 3 (“If the Security Council failed to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi
violation, the resolution did not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against
the threat posed by that country, or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect
world peace and security.”).
168. President Bush, Remarks on the United Nations Security Council Resolution, supra
note 3.
169. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
170. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
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lating the use of force in the international system.171  Much of this ap-
parent failure can be attributed to the paralytic effect of the veto
power.
The UN Charter gives the five permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council the power to veto any substantive resolution.172  This pro-
vision creates a major institutional impediment to the Security Coun-
cil’s effectiveness in managing a global system of collective security.173
Moreover, the voting scheme in the Security Council is an area where
international law and politics are heavily mixed.174  Although the veto
exists to allow a permanent member to block deeply divisive resolu-
tions that would otherwise move the member to withdraw from the
UN,175 permanent members can just as easily cast a veto against a
measure in which they have marginal interest.  For example, China
may never actually fight a war alongside Iraq, but it could still veto a
resolution on Iraq as a check on U.S. power or, perhaps conscious of
its own internal security concerns, to inhibit the development of in-
terventionist rules governing the use of force.
In the current circumstances, the United States does not com-
pletely trust the Security Council to identify and deal with the threat
posed to international peace and security by Saddam Hussein’s re-
gime.  The primary reason for this dilemma is that China, France, and
Russia have veto power.  Since these countries perceive themselves to
be unlikely targets for future Iraqi attacks, they have a greater will-
ingness to assume that Iraq does not pose a sufficiently imminent or
concrete threat to warrant the use of force.  The United States, fear-
ing cataclysmic attacks against itself and possibly Iraq’s neighbors, has
a much different calculus of risk:
We could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to ter-
rorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world.  But
I’m convinced that is a hope against all evidence. . . . [T]here can be
no peace if our security depends on the will and whims of a ruthless
171. Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Arti-
cle 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 540–41 (2002).
172. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, ¶ 3 (The five permanent members are China, France, Russia
(as successor to the USSR), the United Kingdom, and the United States).
173. See AREND & BECK, supra note 156, at 51–52.
174. JOSEPH S. NYE, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 146–47 (1997) (de-
scribing the tendency of states to reach conclusions of legal significance based on their political
allegiance during the Cold War).
175. Id. at 146.
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and aggressive dictator.  I’m not willing to stake one American life
on trusting Saddam Hussein.176
Consequently, the United States is much less demanding in terms
of the factual predicate required to justify a strike on Iraq.177  The
problem with the U.S. argument is that it ultimately invests all states
with a unilateral right both to determine a threat to international
peace and to take action against the threat.  Such a development
would effectively return the international legal order to its nineteenth
century condition, permitting states to attack each other based on
anxiety about their neighbors’ military strength and intentions.
Under this line of reasoning, it would be hard to differentiate a
U.S. strike on Iraq from an Indian strike on Pakistan or even an Iraqi
strike on Israel, a nuclear-armed country that is openly hostile to Iraq
and even bombed Iraq in 1981.178  Surely, one could try to distinguish
Israel’s nuclear program from Iraq’s by arguing that Israel’s nuclear
program was justified as a response to its neighbors’ attempts to de-
stroy its existence.  In defining the “rogue” states that would be sub-
ject to its expanded right of self-defense, the United States similarly
attempted to single out “aggressive” states that possess WMD as tar-
gets for unilateral action.179  Such normative distinctions, however,
could easily become lost in a system where individual states are sole
arbiters of what constitutes a threat to peace and security.
A similar concern is voiced by those who oppose a purported
right of unilateral humanaitarian intervention, and the failure of this
theory to establish itself as a rule of customary international law fur-
ther undermines the U.S. claim of a right to act unilaterally against
Saddam’s regime on behalf of the interests of the international com-
munity.
To override the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, a
right of unilateral humanitarian intervention would generally have to
acquire jus cogens status through the overwhelming support of
states.180  State practice has come up far short of that threshold.181  Op-
ponents of an independent right of forcible humanitarian intervention
176. President Bush, Remarks on Iraq in Cincinnati, supra note 163 (emphasis added).
177. See President Bush, Graduation address at the United States Military Academy, supra
note 16.  See also Allen & De Young, supra note 16.
178. GRAY, supra note 33, at 114.
179. The National Security Strategy of the United States, supra note 165.
180.  Byers & Chesterman, supra note 148, at 180, 183.
     181.  Id. at 183–84.
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further criticize the proposition as an imprudent expansion of the le-
gitimate use of force with limitless potential for misuse.182  These op-
ponents echo the fears expressed by the International Court of Justice
over fifty years ago in the Corfu Channel case in response to the
United Kingdom’s claim of a right to intervene in Albanian waters to
retrieve evidence in connection with the destruction of two British
warships:
[The ICJ] can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the
manifestation of a policy of force such as has in the past given rise
to most serious abuses and such as cannot find a place in interna-
tional law.  It is still less admissible in the particular form it would
take here—it would be reserved for the most powerful states. 183
In the Nicaragua case in 1986, the ICJ concluded that this statement
referred to the illegality of intervention in general.184
The 1991 intervention by the United States, the United King-
dom, and France in northern Iraq to create a safe haven for the Kurds
was only partially justified by the United Kingdom as humanitarian
intervention, and this example offers meager support for the exis-
tence of a general right.185  In 1999, NATO bombed targets in Kosovo
and Serbia to protect Kosovar Albanians from repression.186  NATO
Member States were sufficiently wary of an independent right of hu-
manitarian intervention that they took great care to limit the prece-
dential value of the Kosovo action.187  In addition to NATO’s reluc-
tance to assert the existence of a right beyond the specific case of
Kosovo, the intervention was bitterly opposed by Russia and the non-
aligned states.188  UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan commented that
“enforcement actions without Security Council authorization threaten
the very core of the international security system founded on the
Charter of the United Nations.  Only the Charter provides a univer-
sally accepted legal basis for the use of force.”189
182.  See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 272–73 (3d. ed. 2001)
(discussing NATO’s intervention in Kosovo).
183.  See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 34 (Apr. 9); see also GRAY, supra note
33, at 25.
184.  Nicaragua, supra note 33, at 202; see also GRAY, supra note 33, at 25.
185.  Byers & Chesterman, supra note 148, at 183–84.
186.  Id. at 177.
187.  Id. at 199.
188.  Id. at 184.
189.  Report of the Secretary General on the work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 54th
Sess., Supp. No. 1, ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. A/54/1 (1999).
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Professor Jules Lobel and Michael Ratner argue that, even in a
rare case that was justified on political and moral grounds, such con-
siderations should serve only as mitigating factors.190  A comprehen-
sive prohibition of humanitarian intervention should then prevail to
maintain the integrity of the broader prohibition on the use of force,
so that Article 2(4) is not eroded by a mixture of benign and duplici-
tous interventions.191  Professor Byers and Simon Chesterman con-
clude that:
a select group of states (such as Western liberal democracies, or
perhaps the United States alone) agreeing on criteria [for interven-
tion] amongst themselves—would seriously undermine the current
system of international law: It would also greatly undermine the
position of the United Nations as an effective organization in the
field of peace and security, after the decade in which, despite some
obvious failures, it achieved more than in the previous half-
century.192
These criticisms of NATO’s use of force in Kosovo reflect concerns
about the impact of allowing one state, or a small group of states, to
claim the right both to define the interests of the international com-
munity and to use force in pursuit of those interests outside of the
Charter framework.  The U.S. claim to protect the world from the
threat posed by Iraq raises similar fears.  Just as with the Kosovo in-
tervention, insufficient legal authority exists to support such a claim.
The September 11th terrorist attacks may have reinforced the propo-
sition that the UN Charter system is ill-equiped to deal with contem-
porary security threats, but we must ask whether proposed alterna-
tives to the existing legal framework are superior solutions or just
gateways to a more chaotic system.
* * *
It is encouraging that the U.S. engagement of the Security Coun-
cil resulted in Resolution 1441, but the United States persists in main-
taining a parallel right to enforce the interests of the international
community if the Security Council is immobilized by the veto.193
190.  See Lobel & Ratner, supra note 113, at 137.
    191.  See id.
    192.  Byers and Chesterman, supra note 148, at 202.
193. See President Bush, Remarks on the United Nations Security Council Resolution, su-
pra note 3; Statement by U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte, supra note 3 (“If the Security
Council failed to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violation, the resolution did not con-
strain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by that country, or
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Unilateral action may seem justified in light of the threat presented
by Iraq, but there are countervailing risks in creating a rule of inter-
national law that gives unilateral enforcement powers to any state
strong enough to use them.  If Iraq presents the uniquely grave threat
that the United States says it does,194 then the United States should be
able to convince and cajole the permanent members of the Security
Council to support a resolution subsequent to Resolution 1441 that
specifically authorizes the use of force under Chapter VII of the
Charter.  If the Council remains immobilized by the threat of veto,
the approach proposed in Part IV offers a more measured procedure
for unilateral action than the highly discretionary and potentially ar-
bitrary theory of the United States.
III.  SELF-DEFENSE
The most provocative claim of the United States after September
11th is that it is legally justified in exercising a right of self-defense to
attack hostile “rogue” states and states that harbor terrorists even if
the United States has not been attacked.  As with its claimed right to
enforce the interests of the international community, the United
States maintains a right of preemptive self-defense in parallel with the
process set forth in Resolution 1441.195  Throughout this section, it is
important to remember the axiom that the UN Charter is not a sui-
cide pact.  The Charter will not function if states feel that the fulfill-
ment of Charter obligations may come at the cost of their survival.
This sentiment underlies the self-defense exception of Article 51.
The International Court of Justice considered this proposition in its
1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nu-
clear Weapons: “Furthermore, the Court cannot lose sight of the fun-
damental right of every State to survival, and thus its right to resort to
self-defense, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, when its
survival is at stake.”196  The September 11th terrorist attacks influ-
to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security.”) (emphasis
added).
194. President Bush, Remarks on Iraq in Cincinnati, supra note 163.
195. See President Bush, Remarks on the United Nations Security Council Resolution, su-
pra note 3; Statement by U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte, supra note 3 (“If the Security
Council failed to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violation, the resolution did not con-
strain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by that country, or to
enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security.”) (emphasis
added).
196. 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 96 (July 8).
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enced this current of thought in a way unlike any previous terrorist
attack.  For the foreseeable future, the United States will no longer
conceive of terrorism as merely a sporadic series of pinpricks, but
rather focus on the potential of terrorist attacks to inflict catastrophic
destruction.197
September 11th presents a challenge for international law schol-
ars.  Future U.S. responses can no longer be dismissed as the heavy-
handedness of a reactionary government with no respect for interna-
tional law.  International law scholarship must adapt to address le-
gitimate U.S. security concerns or else risk letting the United States
establish new practices in a vacuum.  Professor Philip Bobbitt identi-
fies the challenge of creating a new legal regime for post–Cold War
era, in which the international community now faces undeterrable
threats.198  Bobbitt observes that two distinct temptations will be to
spiral into “a chaos of self-help” or, alternatively, to “use the discred-
ited multilateral institutions of the nation-state as a way of frustrating
action in order to control the acts of its strongest member, the United
States.”199  The multilateral institutions of the nation-state should not,
however, be discarded when the alternative offered by the United
States is so standardless as to be tantamount to inviting the chaos of
self-help.
A. Classic, Anticipatory and Precautionary: Self-defense Under the
UN Charter and Customary International Law
Aside from use of force authorized by the Security Council under
Article 42, self-defense as set forth in Article 51 constitutes the prin-
ciple exception to the Charter’s general prohibition on the threat or
use of force.  Article 51 explicitly states that the other provisions of
Chapter VII do not prejudice a state’s inherent right of self-defense
to an armed attack.200  On its face, Article 51 permits forcible coun-
termeasures only in response to an armed attack.201  Given the ab-
197. See President Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 20
(“[I]f an emboldened regime were to supply [weapons of mass destruction] to terrorist allies,
then the attacks of September 11th would be a prelude to far greater horrors.”).
198. PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES 820–21 (2002).
199. Id. at 821.
200. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
201. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51; LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND
FOREIGN POLICY 295 (2d ed. 1979).
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sence of an armed attack by Iraq in the current circumstances, the va-
lidity of anticipatory self-defense must be examined.202
While a majority of scholars adopt a narrow construction of Arti-
cle 51, Professor Dinstein points to a significant number of scholars
who believe that customary international law expands the scope of
circumstances permitting a state to act forcibly in self-defense.203  In
particular, these scholars argue that the right of self-defense is exer-
cisable in anticipation of an imminent armed attack (anticipatory self-
defense).204  Professor Dinstein and the balance of international law
publicists conclude that self-defense can only be exercised in response
to an armed attack.205  They are persuaded by the clarity of Article 51
and the overall intent of the UN Charter to narrow the use of force in
international affairs.
Beyond the armed attack predicate, self-defense requires two
principal elements: necessity and proportionality.206  Famously set
forth in the correspondence between the United States and Great
Britain regarding the Caroline incident in 1837,207 these requirements
remain a part of customary international law.208  Necessity requires
that the use of force must be the response of last resort to an armed
attack,209 and prevents self-defense from justifying retaliatory or puni-
tive uses of force.210  Proportionality requires that the force used to
repel the armed attack must bear a rational relationship to the level
of threat and not inflict disproportionate harm.211  The response does
not, however, have to mirror the mode of the attack.212
202. DINSTEIN, supra note 182, at 165.
203. See id. at 167 n.51 (citing D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
187–92 (1958); M.S. MCDOUGAL AND F.P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 232–41 (1961); J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED
NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 44 (1958)).
204. See generally BOWETT, supra note 203 (arguing that the inherent right of self-defense
continues to include a right of anticipatory armed measures).
205. DINSTEIN, supra note 182, at 168.
206. Nicaragua, supra note 33, at 122–23; GRAY, supra note 33, at 105; see also
MALANCZUK, supra note 34, at 316.
207. See R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 89; GRAY,
supra note 33, at 105.
208. GRAY, supra note 33, at 106.
209. Jennings, supra note 207.
210. GRAY, supra note 33, at 106.
211. Id.
212. MALANCZUK, supra note 34, at 317.
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It is sometimes noted that in the Caroline case, no armed attack
had occurred prior to the defensive use of force.213  While one could
interpret the facts of the case to indicate that attacks had already oc-
curred against British territory,214 the Caroline incident is still used as
an early example of anticipatory, or preemptive, self-defense.215  In
claiming a right of preemptive self-defense, the Bush Administration
explained its position as if the existence of such a right was a foregone
conclusion and the only issue was the adaptation of the principle to
the current threats facing the United States.216  On the contrary, the
international community is deeply divided on the existence of such a
preemptive right of self-defense, and no international adjudicatory
body has issued an authoritative decision on the issue.217
Scholars such as Brownlie and Dinstein take a restrictionist view
of the right to self-defense, concluding that Article 51 prohibits an-
ticipatory armed measures because it explicitly requires an armed at-
tack as a predicate for a lawful exercise of self-defense.218  Restric-
tionist scholars maintain that, in requiring an armed attack before the
exercise of self-defense, the framers of the UN Charter intended “to
make acceptable uses of force readily distinguishable from unaccept-
able uses of force.”219  This view also concludes that, because Article
51 only mentions “an armed attack” as a possible predicate for the
exercise of self-defense, the framers deliberately precluded the possi-
bility that a right of self-defense could be activated by other means.220
213. See AREND & BECK, supra note 156, at 72.
214. See Jennings, supra note 207, at 83 (quoting a report of the Law Officers of Great Brit-
ain: “It appears that on the 13th of December last, a numerous Armed body, composed chiefly
of American Citizens, had openly invaded and taken possession of Navy Island, a Part of the
British Possessions.”).
215. AREND & BECK, supra note 156, at 79.
216. The National Security Strategy of the United States, supra note 165 (“For centuries,
international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take
action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.  Legal
scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the exis-
tence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces
preparing to attack.  We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and ob-
jectives of today’s adversaries.”).
217. AREND & BECK, supra note 156, at 73, 79.
218. Id. at 73 (citing IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 275–278 (1963) and DINSTEIN, supra note 182, at 173).
219. See Glennon, supra note 171, at 546 (though Glennon himself does not seem to be a
restrictionist scholar).
220. Id. at 547.
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Other, counter-restrictionist scholars like D.W. Bowett and Wil-
liam V. O’Brien disagree.  They concentrate on the reference in Arti-
cle 51 to the ‘inherent’ right of self-defense as acknowledging the per-
sistence of a wider customary right that includes anticipatory self-
defense.  They also cite events subsequent to the UN Charter’s
drafting, including certain state practices and the failure of collective
security, in support of their view that anticipatory self-defense is an
indispensable right of states.221  Assuming a right of anticipatory self-
defense exists, the exercise of that right still requires “a reasonable
belief that a particular attack, or raid, is imminent.”222  Restrictionist
scholars counter the “inherent right” contention by arguing that, even
if a customary right of anticipatory self-defense existed at the time of
the Charter’s drafting in 1945, the vast weight of subsequent state
practice has eliminated that right by adhering to a much more narrow
interpretation of Article 51.223
There have been three major instances that fit the theoretical
profile of anticipatory self-defense: the 1962 U.S. “quarantine” of
Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis; the 1967 Six Day War between
Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria; and the 1981 Israeli strike against the
Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak.  In reviewing these examples, it is
helpful to keep in mind Professor Gray’s observation that:
[T]he actual invocation of the right to anticipatory self-defence in
practice is rare. States clearly prefer to rely on self-defense in re-
sponse to an armed attack if they possibly can.  In practice they pre-
fer to take a wide view of armed attack rather than openly claim
anticipatory self-defence.  It is only where no conceivable case can
be made for this that they resort to anticipatory self-defence.  This
reluctance expressly to invoke anticipatory self-defence is in itself a
clear indication of the doubtful status of this justification for the use
of force.  States take care to try to secure the widest possible sup-
port; they do not invoke a doctrine that they know will be unac-
ceptable to the vast majority of states.224
The U.S. explanation for its quarantine of Cuba during the Cu-
ban Missile Crisis reflects this reluctance to rely on anticipatory self-
defense.225  In fact, the United States avoided Article 51 altogether
221. AREND & BECK, supra note 156, at 73.
222. D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 898 (5th ed. 1998).
223. GRAY, supra note 33, at 87.
224. Id. at 112.
225. See Abram Chayes, The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba, 47 DEP’T ST. BULL. 763–
65 (Nov. 19, 1962); Glennon, supra note 171, at 546 n.23.
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and instead relied on the provisions for regional measures provided in
Article 52.226
The Six Day War began when, in response to massive troop
buildups and the blocking of the Straits of Tiran by the Arab states,
Israel attacked Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in 1967.  Exemplifying Pro-
fessor Gray’s observation, Israel did not claim anticipatory self-
defense but instead argued that the actions of the Arab states were
irrevocable steps toward war and thus constituted a prior armed at-
tack.227  Professor Dinstein supports the Israeli argument, and uses the
war to demonstrate the difference between interceptive and anticipa-
tory self-defense.228  According to Dinstein, interceptive self-defense
takes place after the aggressor state has taken irrevocable steps to
make an armed attack but before the aggressor is able to actually fire
the first shot.  As an armed attack was effectively underway, Israel’s
right of self-defense was activated, and it did not have to absorb the
first blow from the Arab states in order to activate Article 51.229  In
contrast, anticipatory self-defense occurs when a state acts in re-
sponse to “[mere] threats and potential danger” but not “an attack
being actually mounted.”230  Professor Franck finds that, though Israel
did not advance a claim of anticipatory self-defense, its actions consti-
tute an example of the practice simply because Israel acted before it
suffered any attack.231  Franck then finds that most states considered
Israel’s actions not to be unreasonable, in part because they con-
cluded that an armed attack was imminent.232  This response, accord-
ing to Franck, indicates that anticipatory self-defense “may be a le-
gitimate exercise of a state’s right to ensure its survival.”233
Israel’s 1981 strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak
presents a rare case where a right of anticipatory self-defense was ac-
tually asserted.234  Israel feared that once the reactor was operational,
226. Id.
227. GRAY, supra note 33, at 112–13.
228. See DINSTEIN, supra note 182, at 173.
229. Id.
230. Humphrey Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in Inter-
national Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURS 451, 498 (1952); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 182, at
172.
231. FRANCK, supra note 29, at 104–05.
232. Id. at 105.
233. Id.
234. GRAY, supra note 33, at 114.
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Iraq would use it to create a nuclear weapon to use against Israel.235
Nevertheless, the Security Council passed Resolution 487, condemn-
ing Israel’s attack. 236  The condemnation by the Security Council is
especially significant considering that the United States voted for the
resolution.237  It was unclear whether the Council’s condemnation was
directed at Israel’s claim of anticipatory self-defense or a lack of ne-
cessity for action.238  Indeed, while some states implicitly acknowl-
edged a right of anticipatory self-defense, they still condemned the
action because, as the reactor was not yet finished, no Iraqi armed at-
tack was imminent.239  Professor Franck observes that the question of
imminence turned less on Iraq’s capabilities and more on its propen-
sity to use nuclear weapons.240  In this regard, Franck touches on one
of the critical problems with the question of whether Iraq is likely to
use WMD in the future: “[p]ropensities . . . are obdurately una-
menable to conclusive proof.”241
In reviewing state practice and the opinions of publicists, there is
certainly no consensus opposed to anticipatory self-defense.  Indeed,
many states support a right of anticipatory self-defense in certain
situations,242 particularly where there is strong evidence that an over-
powering attack is imminent.243  Before examining the current situa-
tion with regard to Iraq, it is important to review how the right of self-
defense relates to terrorist attacks.  The complexity of this inquiry
into self-defense doctrine reflects the complexity of the Iraq situation,
where classic state-to-state use of force issues are intertwined with
new concerns about non-state actors and state sponsorship of terror-
ism.
235. Id.
236. See S.C. Res. 487, S/RES/487 (1981).
237. Glennon, supra note 171, at 546 n.23.
238. See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the United States’ Air Operation
Against Libya, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 933, 943–44 (1986).
239. AREND & BECK, supra note 156, at 78–79.
240. FRANCK, supra note 29, at 106.
241. Id.
242. AREND & BECK, supra note 156, at 79.
243. FRANCK, supra note 29, at 107.
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B. Self-Defense and Terrorism
The U.S. response to terrorism after September 11th has been
portrayed as a global “war” against terrorism.244  The adversaries in
this conflict are terrorist groups and the states that harbor them.245
The legal challenge of justifying military intervention grows as the
link between target states and the September 11th attack attenuates.
The question of Iraq compounds this problem because, in addition to
having little or no connection with the September 11th attacks, Iraq’s
sponsorship of terrorism has, until now, been only a secondary con-
cern for U.S. policymakers.246  Nevertheless, the United States bases
its justification of a potential invasion in part on Iraqi support for ter-
rorism.247
Terrorism is a phenomenon that does not fit easily into the mo-
dality of self-defense.  Professors Beck and Arend have succinctly ad-
dressed this ambiguity by posing two questions raised by forcible state
responses to terrorism: (1) Under what circumstances may a victim
state legally respond with armed force to an act of terrorism?; and (2)
How may the state do so?248  Beck and Arend review the differing an-
swers that international law scholars provide for these questions,249
but these responses are of limited help in the case of Iraq.
Assuming there is room in self-defense doctrine for deterrent
counter-terror attacks, the most important issue with regard to Iraq
and terrorism is whether states who merely harbor terrorists open
themselves up to attack.  A notable aspect of the Bush Doctrine is the
policy of making no distinction between terrorists and the states that
harbor them.250  This policy is not altogether new.  In 1986, U.S. Secre-
244. The National Security Strategy of the United States, supra note 165, at part III (“The
United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. . . . We will disrupt
and destroy terrorist organizations.”).  See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, GLOBAL
PATTERNS OF TERRORISM 63 (May 2002).
245. Id.  See also Wendy Ross, Bush Says Iraq Must Permit Weapons Inspections (Nov. 26,
2001) (reporting President Bush’s White House press conference on Nov. 26, 2001), at http://
usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01112608.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2002).
246. POLLACK, supra note 12, at 153.
247. President Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 20.
248. Robert Beck & Anthony Arend, “Don’t Tread on Us”: International Law and Forcible
State Responses to Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT’L. L.J. 153, 156 (1994) [hereinafter Beck & Arend].
249.   See generally id. (surveying the opinions of prominent international law scholars with
regard to the conditions under which states may respond to terrorist attacks and the form that
that response may take).
250. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 37
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1301 (Sept. 11, 2001); Address Before a Joint Session of the Con-
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tary of State George Schultz claimed a similar right for the United
States, adamantly rejecting the proposition that state sovereignty pre-
vented the use of force against terrorists and the states that harbor
them: “It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us
from . . . attacking [terrorists] on the soil of other nations, even for the
purpose of rescuing hostages; or from using force against states that
support, train, and harbor terrorists or guerillas.”251
The Bush Doctrine’s approach to terrorism was manifest in the
U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in 2001; the United States attacked
both al Qaeda forces and the Taliban regime that supported them.252
Before the United States even attacked Afghanistan, the UN Security
Council affirmed that the September 11th attacks gave rise to a right
of self-defense. 253  Passed by the Council the day after the attacks,
Resolution 1368 condemned the attacks and recognized “the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the
Charter.”254  Resolution 1373, passed on September 28th, reaffirmed
the right of self-defense in the context of the September 11th attacks
and went on to reaffirm “the need to combat by all means, in accor-
dance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international
peace and security caused by terrorist acts.”255  Thus, the United
States enjoyed strong support from the Security Council before it had
to articulate the actual case for its actions in Afghanistan and despite
the possibility that existing restrictions on the right of self-defense
precluded a lawful exercise of that right under the circumstances.256
The United States connected the Taliban regime to al Qaeda on
the grounds that it harbored Osama bin Laden and his organization,
gress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347, 1349 (Sept. 20, 2001).  See Podhoretz, supra note 16, at 23 (“The sec-
ond [pillar of the Bush Doctrine] stood tall on a recognition of terrorism as a problem involving
states and therefore calling for a military response (along with other instruments of power,
whether economic or diplomatic).”); Mike Allen, From Both Sides, Promises to Fight On: Bush
Says Hardest Part is Ahead, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2001, at A28; Glennon, supra note 171, at
548 n.31.
251. U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambi-
guity, Address to the National Defense University, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 15, 1986), repro-
duced in 25 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 204, 206 (1986).
252. Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After 11 September,
51 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 401, 408 (2002).
253. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373
(2001).
254. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
255. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
256. Glennon, supra note 171, at 542–44.
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refused to deliver bin Laden to requesting states, and, possibly, on the
grounds that the Taliban increased their responsibility for al Qaeda’s
actions after the fact by endorsing the September 11th attacks.257  As
reflected in Afghanistan, the Bush Doctrine bases the right of self-
defense against terrorism in part on principles of state responsibil-
ity.258  The United States seemed to restrict this right to situations in
which states willfully allow terrorists sanctuary and where such har-
boring results in an attack against the United States.259  The United
States did not go so far as to declare that states were open to attack
merely because terrorists happened to be on their territory.260  The
United States’ narrow articulation of its right of self-defense to ter-
rorist threats seems valid as long as the definition of “harbor” is not
stretched so far as to hold failed states responsible for the operations
of groups that the states are powerless to control.261
Professor Michael J. Glennon laments that, in light of the ICJ’s
Nicaragua decision,262 the Bush Doctrine’s approach to terrorism can-
not be reconciled with existing international law.263  For example,
Glennon interprets Nicaragua to mean that providing weapons and
logistical support to terrorists does not constitute an armed attack.264
The Court’s pronouncements must be understood in the context of an
ongoing civil war.  To be sure, Nicaragua makes it difficult to impute
the injuries caused by insurgents to the state supporting those insur-
gents.265  It is reasonable to suggest, however, that the high threshold
for state responsibility resulted from the evidentiary difficulty of
parsing out blame for thousands of acts in the midst of a complex and
257. Byers, supra note 252, at 408–09.
258. See id. at 408 n.38.
259. Letter from John Negroponte, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., to the
President of the U.N. Security Council (Oct. 7, 2001) (“The attacks on 11 September 2001 and
the ongoing threat to the United States and its nationals posed by the al-Qaeda organization
have been made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan
that it controls to be used by this organization as a base of operation.”) (emphasis added).
260. Byers, supra note 252, at 408–09 (“Although [the U.S. claim] would normally still be
contentious, this is much less of a stretch from pre-existing international law than a claimed
right to attack terrorists who simply happened to be within the territory of another State.”).
261. See id.
262. Nicaragua, supra note 33.
263. See Glennon, supra note 171, at 543–44 .
264. Id. at 542.
265. See id.
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ongoing civil war.266  Terrorist attacks, on the other hand, are much
more discrete events, and a court might be better able to identify a
causal connection between the harboring and the attack.  The Secu-
rity Council, for its part, already recognized the need for self-defense
in response to terrorism by passing Resolutions 1368 and 1373.267
Consequently, the Bush Doctrine, if restrained by the UN Charter’s
general prohibition on the use of force, may be consistent with an
emerging alteration of the right of self-defense in a post–September
11th world.268  Unlike al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, how-
ever, Iraq does not bear responsibility for a recent terrorist attack
against the United States.269  The absence of such an attack limits the
application of any new rule of international law to Iraq because the
strongest endorsements of U.S. action in Afghanistan—Security
Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373—were offered because a severe
attack had already occurred.
C. Does Iraq Pose a Threat Giving Rise to a Right of Self-Defense?
In the pre–September 11th environment, Iraq was not typically
relevant in discussing U.S. responses to terrorism.  The United States
viewed Iraq as a more standard state-to-state threat than as a state
sponsor of terrorism.270  Because of the perceived magnitude of the
threat of catastrophic terrorist attacks in the post–September 11th en-
vironment, the mere possibility of collusion between Iraq and terror-
ists leads policymakers to identify Iraq as an appropriate target in the
War on Terror.271  The result is the Bush Administration’s somewhat
incoherent depiction of Iraq as both a traditional threat and a major
terrorist threat.
1. Iraq and Terrorism.  The last instance of Iraq’s direct in-
volvement in an anti-American terrorist act was the April 1993 plot to
assassinate former President Bush.272  Iraq was even removed from
266. See FRANCK, supra note 29, at 62 (“To qualify [as an armed attack], the Court thought,
the evidence would have had to show a pattern of deliberate despatch of irregular armed forces
into El Salvador from Nicaragua.”).
267. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373
(2001).
268. See Byers, supra note 252, at 409.
269. See POLLACK, supra note 12, at 157.
270. PAUL PILLAR, TERRORISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 160 (2001).
271. See POLLACK, supra note 12, at 157–58.
272. GRAY, supra note 33, at 117.
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the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1982 as part of the U.S.’
tilt toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War.273  The United States only re-
newed Iraq’s listing after it invaded Kuwait in 1990.274  Iraq remains
on the list because it harbors members of the Abu Nidal organization,
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Mujahedin-e Khalq
(MEK), and the Palestine Liberation Front.275  Iraq’s main focus in
supporting terrorism is to use the PKK against Turkey and the MEK
against Iran.276  In addition, Iraq is also involved in the ongoing Pales-
tinian intifadah, supporting Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist
groups277 and awarding $25,000 to the families of Palestinian suicide
bombers.278  Apart from the Abu Nidal organization and the Palestine
Liberation Front, the United States does not claim that any terrorist
organization harbored by Iraq has ever attacked U.S. targets.279  Re-
ported links between Iraq and the 1993 bombing of the World Trade
Center do not appear credible.280  It is, of course, reasonable to imag-
ine that Iraqi-supported terrorist groups may yet attack U.S. targets
in the future.  Still, the U.S. Department of State’s 2001 report on
global terrorism admits that, while the Iraqi regime “continued to
provide training and political encouragement to numerous terrorist
groups,” “its main focus was on dissident Iraqi activity overseas.”281
As Paul Pillar observes, “[t]errorism is by no means the main U.S.
concern regarding Iraq.”282
Indeed, Saddam Hussein’s more secular regime has not been
keen to embrace the militant Islamic forces underpinning most ter-
rorist attacks on the United States.283  Anti-American terrorism has
received far more support from Iran than from Iraq.284  Contacts be-
tween Iraq and al Qaeda have been apparently “tenuous and incon-
sequential,” and Saddam’s secularism may clash with the fundamen-
273. PILLAR, supra note 270, at 170.
274. Id.
275. GLOBAL PATTERNS OF TERRORISM, supra note 244, at 65.
276. POLLACK, supra note 12, at 156.
277. Id. at 156–57.
278. A Decade of Deception and Defiance, supra note 154, at 18.
279. See id.
280. POLLACK, supra note 12, at 156.
281. A Decade of Deception and Defiance, supra note 154, at 18.
282. PILLAR, supra note 270, at 160.
283. Council on Foreign Relations, Iraq, available at http://www.terrorismanswers.com/
sponsors/iraq.html#Q1 (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
284. PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 244, at 64 (“Iran remained the most
active state sponsor of terrorism in 2001”).
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talism of al Qaeda to prevent more meaningful links.285  Why, then, is
Iraq so frequently mentioned as a future battleground of the War on
Terror?  The primary reason is that President Bush has portrayed the
War on Terror as a broad campaign against all terrorist groups of
global reach and states that support or harbor them, not just those re-
sponsible for the September 11th attack.286  He has also deliberately
blurred the distinction between the threat posed directly by Iraq and
the threat posed by terrorists that might or might not strike at the
United States: “[t]error cells and outlaw regimes building weapons of
mass destruction are different faces of the same evil.  Our security re-
quires that we confront both.”287
Iraq’s harboring of some terrorists also coincides neatly with
other, more pressing, U.S. policy priorities to pave the way for inter-
vention.  The Bush Administration has attempted to argue that Iraq’s
involvement in terrorism and links with al Qaeda make their possible
collusion a compelling threat requiring preemptive U.S. action:
We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a
common enemy—the United States of America.  We know that
Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a dec-
ade.  Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq.
These include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medi-
cal treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated
with planning for chemical and biological attacks.  We’ve learned
that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poi-
sons and deadly gases.  And we know that after September the
11th, Saddam Hussein’s regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist at-
tacks on America.288
Despite indications to the contrary,289 the links between Iraq and al
Qaeda may in fact be significant.  It would be hard, though, to main-
tain a prohibition on the use of force in international law if such in-
conclusive information constituted the predicate for the invasion and
occupation of a country.
2. Iraq as an Aggressive State Pursuing Weapons of Mass De-
struction.  In light of the challenge of harmonizing the Iraq situation
and other current threats within the standard modality of self-
285. POLLACK, supra note 12, at 157.
286. President Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 20.  See
Ross, supra note 245.
287. President Bush, Remarks on Iraq in Cincinnati, supra note 163.
288. Id.
289. POLLACK, supra note 12, at 157.
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defense, the Bush Doctrine of preemptive self-defense has emerged
to explain how September 11th has shattered basic assumptions about
peace and security.  By dropping the requirement of an armed attack
and even rejecting the need for an imminent threat in case of preemp-
tive action, the Bush Doctrine makes some dramatic departures from
the existing international law that governs the use of force.290
The United States claims a right to attack preemptively to coun-
ter a “sufficient threat” to its security.291  Despite the measures taken
by the Security Council in Resolution 1441, the United States main-
tains that this right of preemptive action persists with regard to Iraq.292
Little or no evidence exists, however, to suggest that Iraq is planning
an imminent attack or aiding a terrorist group that will execute an
imminent attack.293  Indeed, the methodical planning for a U.S. inva-
sion of Iraq suggests the absence of any imminent threat.294  A U.S.
invasion under these circumstances would go far beyond even antici-
patory self-defense and would constitute unlawful precautionary self-
defense; that is, self-defense in response to threats that are not immi-
nent and may never become imminent.
The Bush Doctrine responds to the current, uncertain threat en-
vironment by shifting to a strategic posture based on preemptive ac-
tion.295  The Bush Doctrine of preemptive action starts with the
premise that, prior to September 11th, powerful states could bear the
cost of narrowly drawn self-defense rights because nuclear deterrence
diminished the prospect of a cataclysmic attack that would threaten
their survival.  NATO and the Warsaw Pact states confronted each
other during the Cold War with the knowledge that both sides were
290. The National Security Strategy of the United States, supra note 165.
291. Id.
292. See President Bush, Remarks on the United Nations Security Council Resolution, su-
pra note 3 (“The United States has agreed to discuss any material breach with the Security
Council, but without jeopardizing our freedom of action to defend our country.”) (emphasis
added); Statement by U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte, U.N. Press Release SC/7564 (Nov. 8,
2002), supra note 3 (“If the Security Council failed to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi
violation, the resolution did not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against
the threat posed by that country, or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect
world peace and security.”) (emphasis added).
293. See POLLACK, supra note 12, at 148.
294. See Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, U.S. Envisions Blueprint on Iraq Including Big
Invasion Next Year, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2002, at A1.
295. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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deterred from aggression.296  This equilibrium saved the UN Charter’s
narrow allowance for the use of force from being discarded outright
by powerful states even though the Charter’s legal restrictions proba-
bly had little to do with the absence of major war between the great
powers.297  The disappearance of the bipolar conflict of the Cold War
has revealed the full implications of the UN system’s failed attempt to
become the world’s dominant regulator of the use of force; a goal en-
visioned in Articles 43 through 47 of the Charter.298  As a result of the
incomplete implementation of the Charter regime for international
order, the use of force has remained the province of individual
states.299  The attraction of self-help is now felt more acutely by the
United States because of the threat posed by the proliferation of
WMD, particularly nuclear weapons.300  In response to this threat, the
United States has chosen to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons to aggressive states by ad hoc intervention.301  The problem
is that the legal justification for this policy choice is extremely difficult
to reconcile with the UN Charter system for the use of force, which
may explain the Bush administration’s conspicuous failure to mention
the UN Charter when discussing preemptive self-defense in its Na-
tional Security Strategy.302
President Bush signaled the change from Cold War thinking
when he declared that “[c]ontainment is not possible when unbal-
anced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those
weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.”303  In-
fluenced heavily by the attacks of September 11th, the Bush Doctrine
296. The National Security Strategy of the United States, supra note 165 (“In the Cold War,
especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adver-
sary.”).
297. See BOBBITT, supra note 198, at 640 (“The irrelevance of international law to the
global, epochal conflict then raging was compounded by changing attitudes toward law itself.”).
298. See id. at 473; U.N. CHARTER arts. 43–47 (providing for the arrangements whereby
Member States would make forces and other resources available to be directed by the U.N.
Military Staff Committee).
299. See BOBBITT, supra note 198, at 473.
300. See id. at 688 (“Insofar as [medium-size states such as Iraq] develop a capacity to deter
Western intervention, they check the West’s power to enforce international norms, as we saw in
the Gulf War.”).
301. See The National Security Strategy of the United States, supra note 165.  See also
BOBBITT, supra note 198, at 713.
302. See The National Security Strategy of the United States, supra note 165.
303. President Bush, Graduation Address to the United States Military Academy, supra
note 16.  See also Allen & DeYoung, supra note 16 (Aides to the President called the contain-
ment comment a reference to Iraq and North Korea).
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conceives of contemporary threats as so qualitatively different from
prior threats that it must discard a reactive security strategy:
It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature
of this new threat.  Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists,
the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as
we have in the past.  The inability to deter a potential attacker, the
immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm
that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not
permit that option.  We cannot let our enemies strike first.304
On the issue of deterrence, President Bush declared that it
“means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or
citizens to defend.”305  While deterrence is not a concept that is recog-
nized in international law, the perceived inapplicability of deterrence
places a new and tremendous strain on the existing international law
governing the use of force.  The United States now faces a future
where a catastrophic attack is always possible, but the source and
timing of an attack is unknown.306  The cost of waiting to respond to a
terrorist attack or an attack by a hostile state has become extremely
high; to the point where the populations of major cities are put at risk.
The Bush Doctrine, perceiving the failure of deterrence to inhibit
terrorists and “rogue” states who possess the will and the means to
wreak catastrophic destruction, avers that the terrorist threat has be-
come an overriding threat to national survival that trumps existing in-
ternational law.  The United States feels it cannot afford to let ter-
rorists have any safe harbor from which to craft a future catastrophic
attack on America.  Some state sponsors of terrorism may even assist
groups in their efforts to acquire WMD.  Just as the terrorists will not
be deterred by the post–attack response, the United States similarly
refuses to speculate as to whether the state sponsor will be deterred
from providing such assistance: “If we wait for threats to fully materi-
alize, we will have waited too long . . . [t]he war on terror will not be
won on the defensive.”307  The United States has therefore claimed a
right of self-defense that may be asserted against state harborers and
state sponsors of terrorism.  Since Saddam Hussein’s regime is cer-
304. The National Security Strategy of the United States, supra note 165.
305. President Bush, Graduation Address to the United States Military Academy, supra
note 16.
306. See BOBBITT, supra note 198, at 811–13 (“Because it may not be possible to determine
the source of the incursion, strategies of retaliation and deterrence, which have served us well in
the past, become less useful”).
307. President Bush, Graduation Address to the United States Military Academy, supra
note 16.
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tainly a harborer and sponsor of terrorism,308 the Bush Doctrine dic-
tates that the United States can assert its right of self-defense against
Iraq.
While it is an intriguing reaction to recent events, the Bush Doc-
trine of preemptive self-defense contains several elements that make
it an unconvincing legal theory.  First, the Bush Doctrine purports to
replace the anticipatory self-defense requirement of an imminent
armed attack with a sliding scale that at some point reaches a “suffi-
cient threat” for preemptive action:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of at-
tack.  Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the
legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—
most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces
preparing to attack.
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities
and objectives of today’s adversaries.
. . .
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive
actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.  The
greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend our-
selves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the en-
emy’s attack.  To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver-
saries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.309
The language of the National Security Strategy reveals the deli-
cate nature of the U.S. attempt to legitimize its post–September 11th
security strategy.  Note that the United States does not explicitly af-
firm the legality of its longstanding policy of preemptive actions
against sufficient threats; referring to preemptive action as an “op-
tion” and not a principle.  In contrasting the reference to the legal
rights of nations over the centuries with the particular discussion of
the policy option the United States reserves for itself, it is possible to
infer that the United States is hesitant to articulate a right that could
be used by other states.  In addition, the discussion of the interna-
tional law governing the use of preemptive force fails to mention the
UN Charter; a seemingly deliberate omission that leads to the ques-
308. David Rose, Iraq’s Arsenal of Terror, VANITY FAIR, May 2002, at 124.
309. The National Security Strategy of the United States, supra note 165.
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tion of why the United States is not articulating its policy in the con-
text of the legal framework that currently governs the use of force.
The principle of anticipatory self-defense, while arguably not an
active rule of customary international law, has always required that
an armed attack be imminent.310  The mere possession of a weapon
that may be used or deployed in a matter of minutes does not, by it-
self, constitute an imminent threat—logic dictates that intent is re-
quired.  An imminent threat requires that an adversary intend to at-
tack the preempting state; otherwise the United States would be
justified in attacking the United Kingdom merely because it possesses
nuclear weapons.  The imminence requirement is extremely problem-
atic in the WMD context, though, because such weapons have great
potential to be used without ever revealing any evidence that an at-
tack is imminent.  The U.S. alternative, the ambiguous concept of
“sufficient threat,” loosens beyond all recognition the requirement
that an attack is likely.
While the threat of WMD may render the imminence require-
ment obsolete, the United States has failed to provide a new rule that
retains any objective restrictions on a state’s discretion to use force.
Under this theory, the Bush Administration argues that the possibility
of collusion between Iraq and al Qaeda, while remote, promises such
terrible harm to the United States that action is justified.  It seems dif-
ficult to reconcile such an expansive right of preemptive action with a
general prohibition on the use of force.  Nevertheless, the United
States has asserted such a right with regard to Iraq, and has continued
to do so despite the passage of Resolution 1441.  The interplay of the
Bush Doctrine of preemptive self-defense with the procedures of the
Security Council may have a profound effect, formally or informally,
on international law.
Former CIA and National Security Council Middle East analyst
Kenneth Pollack has provided an illuminating discussion of U.S. per-
ceptions of the threat posed by Iraq.311  While not purporting to pro-
vide a rigorous analysis of the restrictions imposed on policy options
by international law, he demonstrates that Iraq poses a serious threat
to regional and global stability.  Pollack argues convincingly that Sad-
dam’s Iraq (1) already possesses biological and chemical weapons;312
(2) is pursuing nuclear weapons and will most likely obtain them if
310. HARRIS, supra note 222.
311. POLLACK, supra note 12, at chs. 5, 8.
312. Id. at 170–73.
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not stopped;313 (3) is likely to use or threaten force against some of its
neighbors in the future;314 (4) is unlikely to be deterred by the threat
of retaliatory force by other states, especially once it obtains nuclear
weapons;315 and (5) will be extremely dangerous to confront once it
obtains nuclear weapons because Saddam seems willing to use a nu-
clear weapon if his survival is threatened (i.e., if the world waits until
Iraq obtains a nuclear weapon, it will be too late to stop a nightmare
scenario).316
This factual predicate yields the conclusion that Saddam’s Iraq
poses a grave and exceptional threat to international peace and secu-
rity, and this conclusion is confirmed by the Security Council’s deter-
mination in Resolution 1441.317  Further, the cataclysmic conse-
quences of a nuclear attack against the United States or any of Iraq’s
neighbors means that it is unacceptable to wait for Iraq to attack first.
These conclusions present compelling circumstances for a forceful
policy towards Iraq in the near future.  The dilemma is that interna-
tional law, according to prevailing interpretations, does not recognize
those circumstances as giving rise to a unilateral right to threaten or
use force.  The only remaining option would seem to be Chapter VII
action through the Security Council to either disarm Iraq or invade
Iraq if it refuses to disarm.  The United States has proceeded along
this path, but the circumstances leading to the passage of Resolution
1441 send a mixed signal about the viability of the current interna-
tional legal order.
Given the inclination of many states after September 11th to pre-
serve the status quo or retire the sanctions regime in exchange for the
appearance of normalcy,318 the Security Council likely undertook its
most recent measures because the United States adamantly asserted a
unilateral theory of action against Iraq and threatened that the
United States would act unilaterally if the Council failed to act.  The
Bush Doctrine of preemptive self-defense was advanced to legitimize
this approach.  As shown above, this theory is not supported by ex-
isting international law, and, with its lack of limiting principles, is so
expansive that it would seriously undermine the general prohibition
313. Id. at 174–75.
314. See id. at 149–52.
315. Id. at 268, 272.
316. Id. at 276, 418.
317. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002).
318. See POLLACK, supra note 12, at 224–25.
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on the use of force.  Yet it is this controversial theory that formed
part of the justification for possible unilateral action.  The United
States’ demonstrated will to act unilaterally was probably critical in
moving the Security Council to address Iraq in such a vigorous fash-
ion.  The resulting measures contained in Resolution 1441—arms in-
spections with the burden of proof on Iraq to show it possesses no
WMD or related materials—made unilateral U.S. action temporarily
unnecessary and thereby forestalled an explicit and fundamental de-
parture of the world’s lone superpower from the established interna-
tional legal order.
The U.S. method of engaging the Security Council thus had the
paradoxical effect of sustaining the international legal system through
the use of a threat to act unlawfully.  Perhaps this willingness to
commit a highly visible violation of prevailing international law was
necessary.  Perhaps there was no other way to move the international
community to reconfigure the regime governing the use of force so
that it is compatible with the realities of a new strategic environment.
This environment is characterized by the danger and unacceptable
costs of an unconventional armed attack; the tremendous difficulty of
detecting an imminent unconventional attack; and the perceived in-
ability to deter such an attack with the threat of retaliatory force.  The
extension of Security Council authorization for U.S. policy toward
Iraq has muted the perceived impact of this development; but it re-
mains that the United States is advocating its controversial theory of
precautionary self-defense in parallel with the process of obtaining
the standard Chapter VII authorization for the use of force.319  The
curative effect of explicit Chapter VII authorization for force would
delay the ripening of a debate among states about the validity of pre-
cautionary self-defense, but it is important not to underestimate the
subtle persistence of preemptive self-defense amidst the legitimating
mechanisms of the Security Council.  Indeed, the Security Council has
effectively rewarded the promulgation of the Bush Doctrine of pre-
emptive action by initiating an invigorated inspection process with the
more concrete possibility of forcible measures to enforce compliance.
Because the Security Council, after some cajoling, was willing to
embark on a moderated form of the U.S. policy choice for Iraq, the
United States is unlikely to be deterred in the future from asserting its
claim of a right of precautionary self-defense.  Instead, the United
319. See President Bush, Remarks on the United Nations Security Council Resolution, su-
pra note 3.
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States has used the threat of unilateral preemptive action to create a
dynamic whereby the Security Council must respond to vital U.S. se-
curity concerns in order to stay relevant.  If this is the case, one won-
ders whether it is even necessary for states to approve of the Bush
Doctrine.  At least with regard to Iraq, the United States may achieve
the policy goal the Bush Doctrine was used to support—the removal
of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime—under Chapter VII
of the Charter; a different legal justification that might even have
been a preferable political approach for building a coalition.
If it becomes recognized as a feature of customary international
law, the Bush Doctrine would open the door for states to claim an ex-
ception to the prohibition on the use of force in a virtually limitless
set of circumstances.  An expansion of the legitimate use of force un-
der international law should only take place where there are compel-
ling reasons and clear standards to restrict the scope of the new rule.
Given the chaotic consequences of the new rule articulated by the
United States, it is preferable to redouble efforts to make the Security
Council an effective instrument in dealing with unconventional
threats.
The Bush Doctrine is alluring because it flows from a realistic as-
sessment of the global security environment, but it has no standards
to prevent it from washing away the general prohibition on the use of
force.  As President Bush said, threats need not “fully materialize”
before the United States will use force.320  How slight can a threat be
and still warrant military action?  How can military action in anticipa-
tion of a partially materialized threat be characterized as a policy of
last resort?  How can one formulate a proportionate use of force
when a threat has not fully materialized?  Is the terrorist threat so
completely pervasive that the United States is exempt from the obli-
gation to resolve disputes peacefully?  There is no limiting principle
in this new policy to prohibit the United States from immediately
launching invasions of every potential enemy state across the globe.
It is also important to remember that the Article 2(4) prohibition
is not a one-sided provision that hampers only U.S. policy; it applies
to all members of the United Nations.  Accordingly, an erosion of the
prohibition on the use of force enables not only the United States, but
320. President Bush, Graduation Address to the United States Military Academy, supra
note 16.  See also Allen & DeYoung, supra note 16.
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also all other states to use force more freely.321  U.S. policymakers,
perhaps considering other states too weak to exploit the new rules for
the use of force, may be willing to tolerate this situation.  That would
be tragically shortsighted.  How can the United States advance its
new strategic policy of preemption, and yet tell India, a nuclear
power, that it must refrain from striking Pakistan for its harboring of
Kashmiri insurgents, whom some would label terrorists?  Despite the
horrific example of September 11th, the Bush Doctrine, if taken to its
logical conclusion, is too all-encompassing to conform to even an ex-
pansive reading of the UN Charter.
D. Mandatory Recourse to the Security Council: An Alternative to
the Bush Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense
The challenge of providing an alternative to the Bush Doctrine
lies in the limited extent to which the United States will alter its secu-
rity policy for the sake of international law.  A proposal that is too
stringent will likely be ignored by the United States and similarly po-
sitioned states that feel compelled to address serious threats to their
interests.  One response to this challenge would be to acquiesce to the
proposals of the United States; to let the Bush Doctrine set the stan-
dard for the use of force in the twenty-first century.  The problem
with acquiescence, as noted above, is that the Bush Doctrine is really
no standard at all but a license to powerful states to use force at their
own discretion.
Another alternative would be to use the concept of mitigation to
deal with cases such as Iraq.  This approach counsels that the integrity
of the law should not be sacrificed because of an exceptionally chal-
lenging case.322  Thus, unilateral force absent an imminent armed at-
tack would remain unlawful and difficult situations such as Iraq would
instead be addressed by the tendency of states to moderate their criti-
cism and countermeasures as a means of acknowledging a reasonable
response to a compelling circumstance.  The problem with mitigation
is that it works best if it only needs to be employed sparingly.  If un-
conventional threats like WMD proliferation, terrorism, and humani-
tarian disasters are commonplace, then mitigation may degenerate
into a de facto customary justification for unilateral force.  Because
these unconventional threats will likely become commonplace (if they
321. GRAY, supra note 33, at 23 (“the language of states in their interpretation and applica-
tion of the UN Charter could operate as a precedent and later be invoked against them.”).
322.  See FRANCK, supra note 29, at 175.
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are not already), the better solution is to craft a rule that explicitly
justifies responses to such situations.  In the hope that there is a mid-
dle course between the flawed UN Charter framework and the Bush
Doctrine’s wholesale regression to self-help, a possible alternative is
to build upon the multilateral approach taken by the United States in
obtaining Resolution 1441.
In cases such as the current standoff with Iraq—cases of precau-
tionary self-defense where a state feels threatened but has not been
attacked and is not faced with an imminent threat—it is worth con-
sidering a new rule of international law that requires such a state to
channel its response through the Security Council.  As set forth in Ar-
ticle 51 of the UN Charter, the right of self-defense is already subject
to a retrospective reporting requirement.323  This new rule would re-
quire prospective engagement of the Council in order for instances of
precautionary self-defense to be considered valid.
The first element of this rule requires that a state present its case
to the Security Council and offer the Council an opportunity to ad-
dress the threat through measures taken under Chapters VI and/or
VII of the UN Charter.  Failure to make prior recourse to the Secu-
rity Council would then be considered prima facie evidence of unlaw-
ful use of force.
If the pleading state is unsatisfied with the Council’s response, it
is then obligated to seek the Council’s confirmation that unilateral ac-
tion constitutes lawful self-defense.  This process would employ the
Security Council as a quasi-jury reviewing the validity of a proposed
exercise of a unilateral right (as with Resolution 1368 before the U.S.
intervention in Afghanistan), in contrast to the Council’s role of
quasi-legislature taking collective measures to address threats to in-
ternational peace and security.
In presenting its case to the Security Council, the pleading state
would bear the burden of providing evidence that establishes, to a
reasonable extent given the circumstances, (a) that the pleading state,
or a state requesting the assistance of the pleading state, faces a seri-
ous threat from another state or a non-state entity operating in an-
other state; and (b) that the circumstances make it unreasonable for
the pleading state to wait until it is attacked or an attack is imminent
(e.g., that the threat of a nuclear attack is an unacceptable risk to bear
323.  U.N. Charter art. 51 (“taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council”).
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under the circumstances).  The pleading state would not be excused
from its burden by a claim that the production of evidence would pos-
sibly reveal information detrimental to its national security (e.g., the
disclosure of intelligence sources and methods); the extraordinary
remedy sought by the pleading state demands that it go to great
lengths to demonstrate the necessity for such an action.
The case would then be put to a vote of the Security Council,
with the outcome determined regardless of whether a vote was cast by
a permanent member of the Council.  A reasonable number of votes
in favor of the pleading state’s proposed exercise of self-defense
would constitute prima facie evidence that the right of self-defense
was activated (the actual armed action would still be required to con-
form to the principle of proportionality).  The number of votes consti-
tuting a reasonable number of affirmative votes would depend on the
circumstances.  Nine affirmative votes, a simple majority of the fif-
teen-member Council, would likely be insufficient if all nine votes
were cast by states that were going to participate in a given action.
To illustrate further, imagine that the United States and its allies
were seeking ratification of their claim to act in self-defense against
State X.  State X is a country hostile to the United States, is attempt-
ing to obtain WMD, and has a history of aggressive behavior.  Sup-
pose the United States and its allies were frustrated in their attempts
to obtain a Chapter VII resolution authorizing force by the threat of
veto by China and Russia.  The United States then makes its case to
the Council for action in self-defense and puts to a vote a draft resolu-
tion affirming that action in self-defense is appropriate under the cir-
cumstances.  The draft resolution receives twelve votes in favor (in-
cluding several states who are not parties to the dispute), but is
defeated by the negative votes of China and Russia.  According to
Article 27 of the Charter, the draft resolution fails.324  Under the pro-
posed customary rule, however, the affirmative votes of twelve mem-
bers of the Council establish a presumption that the proposed exer-
cise of self-defense is valid.  Though the use of force against State X
will now take place under conditions not originally approved of by
the Charter, the United States and its allies would likely have acted
regardless, as they did in Kosovo.
The goals of this proposed rule are to maximize the opportunities
for collective measures in situations where a state might otherwise act
324.  See U.N. CHARTER art. 27.
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hastily and to provide the opportunity for collective deliberation on
unilateral action where collective measures are frustrated by the veto.
The advantage of this new approach as opposed to the current system
is that it subjects claims of precautionary self-defense to international
debate in a formal and institutionalized procedure before the act has
occurred.
The underlying assumption of this rule is that one of the most
important ways in which international law influences the behavior of
states is by affecting the perceived legitimacy of governments; that
states are willing to incur certain costs to promote their interests in a
way that is perceived as legitimate by the international community.
There is, of course, a limit to the tolerance of states for the costs of
appearing legitimate.  If international law rules are too restrictive,
states may choose to ignore them in pursuit of key policy goals, par-
ticularly when national security is implicated.  The challenge for the
progressive development of international law with regard to the use
of force is to achieve a system of rules that imposes effective restric-
tions on international violence without becoming so restrictive as to
be ignored by the most powerful states.  The proposed rule hopefully
takes a modest step in that direction, and the persistence of interna-
tional conflict suggests that we should expect only modest results
from international legal rules.
* * *
The doctrine of self-defense must be adapted to recognize that
states have a legitimate right to defend themselves against terrorist
attacks and reckless states possessing WMD.  States must have rea-
sonable leeway to counter threats that are extremely difficult to de-
tect.  The great challenge is to formulate a rule that, in the event the
Security Council is unable or unwilling to act, allows states to protect
their survival without obliterating the prohibition on the use of force.
A rule of customary international law that requires states to engage
the Security Council before acting in precautionary self-defense may
meet that challenge.  If the Bush Doctrine of preemptive self-defense
is the best possible solution, then the future of the current interna-
tional legal order is grim indeed.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The potential justifications for unilateral intervention in Iraq are
inconsistent with existing international law.  That is not to say defini-
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tively that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq does not or will not present a
credible threat to the United States or the international community,
just that it does not currently present a threat that is recognized by in-
ternational law as giving rise to unilateral armed intervention.  The
standoff over Iraq reflects the difficulty with which international law
addresses the unconventional threats that states will be increasingly
likely to face: weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.325
In the face of this difficulty, Resolution 1441 was a step in the
right direction.  The United States perceived an unconventional
threat and channeled it through the mechanisms of the Security
Council.  On the other hand, the United States may have placed the
Security Council under duress when it brought the Iraq matter before
it in September 2002, challenging the Council to remain relevant and
threatening to use force unilaterally if the Council did not respond
adequately.  The United States rested this challenge on theories for
the use of force that, if accepted by states, would expand considerably
the circumstances in which force may be used lawfully.  The United
States also maintained the validity of these theories after recourse to
the Security Council, preserving justifications for unilateral action if
the Council fails to follow Resolution 1441 with an explicit authoriza-
tion to use armed measures.  Moreover, if the Council continues to
respond to threats of unilateral action by accommodating the U.S. po-
sition, the development of independent customary rules may be un-
necessary.
The practice of the United States over recent years and espe-
cially after September 11th may eventually alter the law, but, over the
long term, such alterations are risky.  It is dangerous to construct a le-
gal order which permits a single state to enforce what it perceives to
be the collective interest and also grants a virtually standardless right
of self-defense.326  It is easy to imagine a succession of other states that
will justify their aggressive uses of force by referring to the way the
United States acted when it felt threatened by Iraq.  The United
States no doubt anticipates this and would like to restrict the prece-
dent-setting impact of any action toward Iraq.327  Given the propensity
325. See FRANCK, supra note 29, at 3–4 (describing the emergence of indirect aggression and
weapons of mass destruction as two of four “seismic developments” that seriously undermined
the effectiveness of the U.N. Charter system governing the use of force).
326. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4); Nicaragua, supra note 33; GRAY, supra note 33, at 24.
327. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, supra note 165 (“The
United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use
preemption as a pretext for aggression.”).
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of states to grasp at any remotely plausible legal justification,328 how-
ever, the U.S. attempt to confine these rights to itself seems unlikely
to dissuade an aggressive state seeking to legitimize its actions.
The Iraq crisis embodies the challenges to the international order
that have emerged in the post–Cold War period.  The legal regime
provided by the UN Charter and customary international law is
straining to address these challenges.  The problem with the parallel
justifications offered by the United States to support unilateral inter-
vention in Iraq is that they may obliterate that regime without pro-
viding a stable and coherent alternative.  The Security Council de-
layed the impact of these justifications, but they may reemerge in the
future when the Council is immobilized by the veto.
Perhaps it is impossible to realign the existing rules on the use of
force to match the altered international security environment and yet
maintain meaningful limits on the use of force.  On the other hand, it
may be possible to achieve a viable solution by creating a rule of cus-
tomary international law that requires states to approach the Security
Council before self-defense may be used as a precaution against un-
conventional threats.  Consolation may be found in the fact that the
United States muted its parallel justifications somewhat when it en-
gaged the Security Council, even to the extent that the United States
agreed to a renewed inspections effort that some in the Bush admini-
stration wanted to avoid.  International law may, after all, have some
effect on the behavior of powerful states.
Patrick McLain
328. See GRAY, supra note 33, at 6 (“It is clear that in the overwhelming majority of cases of
inter-state use of force both states involved invoke self-defence against an armed attack by the
other state.”).
